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CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND COMPUTER CRIME
LAURENT SACHAROFF*
ABSTRACT
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) criminalizes the
simple act of trespass upon a computer—intentional access without
authorization. The law sweeps too broadly, but the courts and
scholars seeking to fix it look in the wrong place. They uniformly
focus on the term “without authorization” when instead they should
focus on the statute’s mens rea. On a conceptual level, courts and
scholars understand that the CFAA is a criminal law, of course, but
fail to interpret it comprehensively as one.
This Article begins the first sustained treatment of the CFAA as a
criminal law, with a full elaboration of the appropriate mens rea
based upon congressional intent, cognate state criminal trespass
statutes, and recent Supreme Court guidance on federal mens rea in
general. A fully realized mens rea sweeps away many of the unjust
potential applications of the CFAA on a far more principled basis
than does a focus on, and re-writing of, “without authorization.”
My interpretative approach limits unjust applications of the
provision, but many will remain. In a coda, I briefly show why we
should likely abolish the trespass provision of the CFAA. The flaws
of the CFAA, such as criminalizing ordinary and innocent behavior
and arbitrary enforcement, flow from the same pathologies already
inherent in criminal trespass law.
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville; J.D., Columbia
Law School; B.A., Princeton University. The author would like to thank Orin Kerr, Ric
Simmons, Alan Trammell, Thomas E. Kadri, the participants of the CrimFest! Workshop, as
well as Hannah Hungate for research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) criminalizes the
simple act of computer trespass.1 It targets anyone who “intention-
ally accesses a computer without authorization.”2 The defendant
need not have a bad motive or an intent to gain, nor cause any harm
or damage to the computer or its owner. This simple trespass
provision, section 1030(a)(2)(C), remains the most frequently
charged crime of the CFAA subsections.3 It is also the most frequent
count in analogous civil lawsuits.4
Scholars5 and courts6 have rightly sounded the alarm at the
apparent breadth of this trespass provision and its potential to
criminalize everyday behavior. They have pointed to the term
“without authorization” as the culprit. They call it vague and
unconstitutional; they say it fails to provide notice, especially when
it rests upon obscure terms of service.7 For example, Facebook’s
terms of service prohibit those under thirteen years old from
creating an account.8 If a twelve-year-old child creates a Facebook
account, has she committed a federal crime because she “access[ed]
a computer without authorization”?9
Many of these scholars have long advocated for a particular
solution: courts should hold that terms of service can never establish
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
2. Id. § 1030(a)(2). Subsection (a)(2)(C) lists two further elements, using the access to
“obtain[ ] ... information from any protected computer,” but these two additional elements are
always met for any computer connected to the internet. 
3. Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U. PA. L.REV. 1453, 1493 (2016) (finding
47 percent of all CFAA criminal cases charge simple computer trespass).
4. Id. at 1487 (finding 67 percent of all CFAA civil filings claim simple computer
trespass).
5. E.g., Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1472-73 (2016); Orin S. Kerr,
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes,
78 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1596, 1598-99 (2003); Mayer, supra note 3, at 1463 n.32 (collecting scholars’
critiques of the CFAA as “overbroad or overly punitive”).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Nosal (Nosal I), 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 466 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://perma.cc/
6Z58-S4U7].
9. Cf. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 861.
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that access is without authorization.10 Instead, many have argued
for a code-based test. Access is without authorization only if the
intruder circumvented some code-based barrier, such as hacking a
password.11
Until very recently, courts had flirted with this code-based test,
but declined to formally adopt it.12 Then in September 2019 came a
bombshell. The Ninth Circuit in hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn adopted, in
part, this code-based test.13 The court held that accessing a site to
scrape millions of profiles against the express wishes of the platform
likely does not violate the CFAA because the information is not
protected by a password login or other authentication mechanism.14
Courts and scholars misdiagnose the problem as arising from the
element “without authorization” and propose the wrong solution in
the form of a code-based test.15 At the same time, they often ignore
the mens rea requirement of the statute16 or fail to recognize its full
potential.17 Orin Kerr has highlighted this problem: “Courts have
not explored the role of mental state in establishing liability for
computer trespass.”18
This Article, therefore, argues that we should focus on the mens
rea of the CFAA. Doing so will exempt from prosecution the vast
majority of examples given as potential unjust applications of the
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1161
(2016).
12. See Bellia, supra note 5, at 1468-69; Mayer, supra note 3, at 1503.
13. 938 F.3d 985, 1003 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9,
2020).
14. See id. at 1003-04. The Ninth Circuit reviewed a preliminary injunction and thus only
ruled that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits. See id. at 1005. Nonetheless, I treat
the holding as though it were on the merits.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See, e.g., Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (making no mention of mens rea).
17. E.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 467 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (discussing mens rea
but failing to give it appropriate effect); Bellia, supra note 5, at 1470 (defining the “scienter”
requirement as “knows or has reason to know” rather than “knows”); Josh Goldfoot & Aditya
Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1479
(2016) (using “knew or should have known”). But see William A. Hall, Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s
Deficient Examination of the Legislative History of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in
United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1523, 1529-30 (2016) (emphasizing a mens rea
of knowingly in exceeding authorized access cases); Kerr, supra note 11, at 1180 (noting the
“critical role” of mens rea in interpreting the CFAA).
18. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1180.
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CFAA. When properly interpreted, the CFAA applies a mens rea of
knowingly to the statute’s element “without authorization.” An
individual must know that her intrusion is “without authorization.”
This stringent mens rea requirement will spare the unwitting
twelve-year-old Facebook user who creates an account unaware of
the prohibition.
Now the text of the CFAA uses the mens rea term “intention-
ally.”19 But, as I detail below, this term collapses into knowingly
when applied to “without authorization.”20
A proper appreciation of the CFAA’s mens rea of knowingly leads
to several conclusions. First, it undermines the common argument
that “without authorization” in the CFAA is unconstitutionally
vague because that argument rests primarily on lack of notice. A
mens rea of knowingly means that an individual does have actual
notice that her access is without authorization. Indeed, in the
physical world, court after court has held that criminal trespass
laws are not unconstitutionally vague.21 “Without authorization” is
perfectly comprehensible—it means “stay out.”22
Second, a mens rea of knowingly imports a kind of mistake of law
defense into the CFAA. Suppose an individual lacks authorization
because of operation of some other law, regulation, or even simply
a proper interpretation of a platform’s terms of service. The mens
rea of knowingly requires that the defendant be aware of these other
sources, such as some other law, and subjectively understand that
this other law, regulation, or term of service prohibits her access.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
20. Congress relied upon the Model Penal Code in drafting the CFAA, see infra notes 204-
05 and accompanying text, and the Model Penal Code, in turn, justifies applying a mens rea
of knowingly to “without authorization.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(ii), (2)(b)(i), (4) (AM.
L. INST. 1962).
21. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 42 (1966); Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840,
843 (Fla. 1979) (“We conclude that [‘authorized’ is] of such common understanding and usage
that persons of ordinary intelligence are fully able to determine what conduct is proscribed
by the challenged enactment.”), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Cohen v. Katsaris, 530 F.
Supp. 1092 (N.D. Fla. 1982); see also infra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
22. Rayburn v. State, 300 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ga. 1983) (holding that a trespass statute was
not unconstitutionally vague and that a warning to “stay out” provided sufficient notice that
presence was unauthorized); see also, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147
(1943); Bowman v. United States, 212 A.2d 610, 611 (D.C. 1965); WAYNE LAFAVE, SUB-
STANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.2(a) (3d ed. 2019).
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She must grasp that the effect of this other law is to revoke her
authorization.23
Third, this Article shows that federal courts often instruct juries
incorrectly concerning mens rea. Judges leave juries unaware they
must find that the defendant knew her access was without authori-
zation or that she exceeded authorization.24 The jury instructions
instead suggest that the government must prove that the defen-
dant’s intent related to the conduct of accessing the computer only,
and if that intentional access was also without authorization, the
defendant is guilty—without the additional showing that the
defendant knew she lacked authorization. Below I illustrate this
critical failure with an Eleventh Circuit case pending before the
Supreme Court in its October 2020 term, Van Buren v. United
States.25
Finally, this mens rea of knowingly will render unnecessary a
code-based regime. True, if a person hacks into a system, that fact
might be strong evidence that she knew her access was without
authorization, but the touchstone remains knowledge. A hack is
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish knowledge and is
therefore not an appropriate test.
To support my interpretation of the CFAA, this Article dives
deeply into the statute’s text, legislative history, and reliance on the
Model Penal Code. This Article has the advantage of the Court’s
recent pronouncement on federal mens rea in Rehaif v. United
States and applies its holding and analogous reasoning here. It also
carefully considers state criminal trespass laws in the physical
world to lend further support to the mens rea approach.26
My proposal will greatly simplify the case law muddied by a focus
on “without authorization” and courts’ baroque redefinition of that
23. Mistake of law is not always a defense, of course, but the Court in Rehaif v. United
States made clear it is under these circumstances. 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2019).
24. See infra Part V.B.
25. 206 L. Ed. 2d 822 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) (No. 19-783).
26. Congress intended courts to analogize the CFAA to state criminal trespass laws. See
infra Part IV.A; see also United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 525 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he
legislative history consistently characterizes the evil to be remedied—computer crime—as
‘trespass.’”); Kerr, supra note 11, at 1153-54; Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 13 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 20 (2012); Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 17,
at 1494.
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term.27 Different circuits have split on the meaning of the term
“without authorization,” along numerous fault lines,28 and even the
case law within the Ninth Circuit has become nearly incoherent.29
The courts have taken a plain meaning term, “without authoriza-
tion,” and made it vague. An effective mens rea reduces the ambit
of the statute far more simply and effectively than does a focus on
the term “without authorization.”
This Article ends with a coda, somewhat in tension with the rest
of the Article but important nevertheless. The bulk of this Article
accepts the CFAA as written and suggests the best interpretation
based upon ordinary tools of statutory interpretation and construc-
tion. That interpretation also happens to ameliorate many of its
potentially unjust applications as a happy byproduct.
But even my proposed interpretation leaves many unjust
outcomes. The coda to this Article, therefore, makes a somewhat
different argument: Congress should abolish the trespass provision
of the CFAA. The provision will always remain unjust because at
bottom, it criminalizes mere presence without any other harm, such
as damaging the target computer or stealing valuable information.
This coda sketches the history of unjust criminal trespass cases in
the physical world to illustrate this problem.
In Part I, this Article surveys the breadth of the CFAA trespass
provision using multiple examples. Part II surveys the diagnosis
and solution by courts and other scholars: their undue focus on the
term “without authorization” and the code-based regime as their
proposed solution. Part III argues instead that we should focus on
the CFAA’s mens rea, why knowingly applies to “without authoriza-
tion,” and how powerful this mens rea can be. Part IV draws upon
state trespass statutes and case law to reach similar conclusions.
Part V applies these lessons to typical CFAA scenarios. Part VI
27. E.g., Bellia, supra note 5, at 1445-60 (grouping CFAA cases into five categories based
upon their different interpretations or theories of the statute).
28. Compare Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting terms of service as
a basis for unauthorized access), with EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 64
(1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting in dicta that terms of service suffice), with United States v. Valle,
807 F.3d 508, 526 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding the statute to be ambiguous and applying the rule
of lenity), with Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006)
(applying state duty of loyalty law for employees and agency theory).
29. See infra Part II.C.
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directly challenges the key justifications for a code-based approach,
particularly in light of my own proposal. Part VII draws the final
lesson from criminal trespass law in a coda: computer trespass
suffers from many of the same injustices as its physical world
analogue. Rather than trying to fix the CFAA to conform more
comfortably with the criminal trespass analogy, we should abolish
its trespass provision in order to avoid importing criminal trespass’s
pathologies.
I. AN OVERBROAD STATUTE
This Part shows how the CFAA has evolved into an extremely
broad statute that criminalizes simple trespass to any computer
merely to view any type of information. It shows how this breadth
can lead to unjust applications with particular examples.
A. The CFAA
The CFAA criminalizes simple trespass in section 1030(a)(2)(C)—
intentionally accessing a computer without authorization.30 It also
requires that a person obtain information, but since observing
information suffices,31 this element adds almost nothing. That is,
the trespass provision of the CFAA almost completely parallels
simple criminal trespass. Its formula—(i) intentionally (ii) access
(iii) a computer, (iv) without authorization—precisely tracks a
typical criminal trespass statute: (i) knowingly (ii) enter (iii) a
building (iv) without authorization.32 We simply replace “enter” with
“access” and “building” with “computer.”
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). The provision applies to “protected computers,” but its
definition effectively includes any computer connected to the internet and even perhaps some
that are not. Id. § 1030(e)(2); see also Kerr, supra note 5, at 1663 n.284 (“The term ‘protected
computer’ is defined extremely broadly to include essentially every computer connected to the
Internet.”); Jack Dahm, No Internet Does Not Mean No Protection Under the CFAA: Why
Voting Machines Should Be Covered Under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1775,
1791 (2019) (arguing that even some computers not connected to the internet fall under the
CFAA).
31. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 10 (1986) (explaining that the phrase “obtains
information” includes merely “observing” or “accessing” it).
32. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.08(1) (West 2020) (“Whoever, without being authorized,
licensed, or invited, willfully enters or remains in any structure or conveyance.”).
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I call this crime “entry-level” both because it is a misdemeanor
only33 and because it forms a lesser included offense for most of the
other provisions. For example, section 1030(a)(1) criminalizes
computer trespass—access without authorization—in order to
obtain classified information that could be used against the United
States and delivering the information to someone not entitled to it.34
Section 1030(a)(4) criminalizes trespass in order to commit fraud
and obtain at least $5,000 in value.35 Parts of section 1030(a)(5)
criminalize trespass that causes damage to a computer, such as
deleting data or altering it or making a computer unavailable to
others and monetary loss to the company as a result.36
These other provisions are all trespass plus other elements. In its
legislative history, Congress expressly referred to section 1030(a)(4)
as “trespass plus theft,” explaining it meant section 1030(a)(2) plus
theft.37 When we interpret the trespass provision of the CFAA, we
must remember that the same formula appears in several of the
other criminal provisions, and its meaning must likely remain the
same across subsections.
This simple trespass provision was not always so broad, and its
development helps us to understand just how broad it has become.38
It originally criminalized, as it does today, access without authoriza-
tion to obtain information, but it sharply limited the type of infor-
mation (and therefore the types of computers) that counted.39 It only
applied to classified information that the intruder intended to be
used against the United States, a bank’s financial information about
a customer, or a credit agency’s information about a consumer.40 It
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(A).
34. Id. § 1030(a)(1).
35. Id. § 1030(a)(4).
36. Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)-(C).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 12 (1986) (“There must be a clear distinction between
trespass plus theft, punishable as a felony, and mere computer trespass, punishable as a
misdemeanor.”).
38. See generally, Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561 (2010).
39. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190-92.
40. Id.
580 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:571
also prohibited altering or damaging computer information, but only
on a government computer.41
In part because the text limited the CFAA, we can infer Congress
intended to protect particularly sensitive computers and informa-
tion, such as those of banks and the federal government.42 These
computers were not open to the public and were generally protected
by passwords. Therefore, the textual limits to these computers and
information reflected Congress’s worry about outsiders hacking in,
especially by breaking passwords.43
But in 199644 and later years,45 Congress greatly expanded the
scope by applying the trespass provision, access without authoriza-
tion, to any computer that is in or affects interstate or foreign
commerce, meaning—at minimum—any computer, anywhere in the
world, connected to the internet.46 Congress also made clear that
“obtain information” now means any type of information, not just
classified or government information.47 Even worse, “obtain” already
included simply to “observe” the information and does not require
any kind of downloading or copying.48 Finally, the term “accesses”
has been read so broadly as to impose almost no limit at all, as long
as the defendant’s computer connects to the target computer.49
To foreshadow my argument in Part IV slightly, the above
observations undermine the central pillar of the hiQ Labs case: that
the CFAA protects private, not public, information and computers
and draws that division by way of an authentication gate, such as
a password login. The CFAA originally may well have done so by
limiting the types of information and computers protected. But
when Congress eliminated those limits and applied the CFAA to any
information and any computer connected to the internet, it wiped
41. Id.
42. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert.
filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2020).
43. Id.
44. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 201, 110 Stat. 3488, 3491-92.
45. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 814(d)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 384.
46. Kerr, supra note 38, at 1566-71.
47. See Economic Espionage Act, § 201(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 3492.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 10 (1986).
49. Kerr, supra note 38, at 1561.
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away any such division between private and public information,50
and similarly, rendered irrelevant a dividing line between those two
based on a password login.
Putting together these amendments and definitions, the current
entry level trespass provision of the CFAA becomes simple: it
applies to anyone who intentionally accesses a computer connected
to the internet without authorization. The prohibited conduct
includes visiting the landing page of a newspaper, LinkedIn, or
Google. It includes, of course, the further steps of creating an
account. It also includes an employee who accesses a work com-
puter. If the individual knows this conduct is without authorization,
she may have violated the statute; if she is personally told to stay
off, she almost certainly has.
“Entry level” suggests this crime is not serious. But first, all
federal crime is serious. Second, prosecutors can easily, almost
trivially, bump this misdemeanor to a felony.51 Third, this trespass
provision serves as a lesser included offense and predicate for the
other more serious subsections, such as the fraud felony provision.52
Of the CFAA subsections, the simple trespass provision is the
most widely brought criminal charge, as well as the most widely
pleaded cause of action in civil suits.53 Many of the cases construing
the trespass provision are, in fact, civil cases,54 and this may explain
why courts have ignored or minimized the role of mens rea when
interpreting the statute. They should not, though. Courts agree that
even in a civil case, the statute must be interpreted as if it were a
criminal case because the terms must be given the same meaning
in both contexts.55
50. Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“For
example, Congress might have written § 1030(a)(2) to protect only ‘nonpublic’ information.”).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii). Prosecutors need only show the information obtained
has a value of at least $5,000. Id. They need not show the defendant gained $5,000, nor that
the victim lost $5,000. See United States v. Batti, 631 F.3d 371, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2011). Merely
viewing information that itself happens to be worth $5,000 makes the conduct a felony. See
id.
52. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
53. See Mayer, supra note 3, at 1492-93.
54. See id. at 1487.
55. LVRC Holdings L.L.C. v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here a
statute [such as the CFAA] ‘has both criminal and noncriminal applications,’ courts should
interpret the statute consistently in both criminal and noncriminal contexts.” (quoting Leocal
v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004))).
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One clarification: I have treated the CFAA as prohibiting initial
unauthorized access only, but it also prohibits, in the alternative,
exceeding authorized access, much as ordinary criminal trespass
statutes do.56 In particular, the text targets a person who “intention-
ally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds autho-
rized access.”57
I treat the two alternatives, unauthorized access or exceeding
authorized access, as amounting to the same test simply applied in
different situations. The element “without authorization” applies to
an outsider who lacks authorization to access at all. “Exceeds
authorized access” applies to an insider, such as an employee who
may legitimately access the computer but may not open certain files
or folders.58 The test for the first case is whether the access is with
authorization; for the second, whether the person is entitled to
obtain the additional information. An employee in the shipping
department may be authorized to access the computer and the
folders concerning shipping, but not entitled to obtain information
from the human resources folders on the network.
“Authorized” and “entitled” are synonyms, and, as a result, the
test for each situation will boil down to the same question: did the
person enjoy authorization to access and obtain the information
they accessed and obtained? The employee in shipping is authorized
to access the computer, but he is not entitled to obtain information
from human resources, such as the salary information of his
coworkers.
Put another way, the two formulas, to “access without authoriza-
tion” and “to exceed” authorized access and obtain information a
person is not “so entitled to obtain,” appear different but are the
same because the conduct is the same. To access a computer means
to obtain information. The individual sends information to the
computer and receives information in response to establish any kind
of access at all. To say the person’s access is without authorization
is the same as saying she is not entitled to obtain the information
56. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00(5) (McKinney 2020) (“A license or privilege to enter or
remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to
enter or remain in that part of the building which is not open to the public.”).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
58. Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
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she obtains by accessing it. True, the emphasis is different, but the
test remains nearly the same.59
This regime parallels the physical world of trespass. A person’s
initial entry into another’s home is measured by whether that entry
is licensed or authorized by the owner; the same test applies, once
the person is in the home, to whether she can go upstairs to poke
around the bedroom—is that additional step authorized?60 Now we
will look to a variety of factors and social customs to answer that
question, but the test to which we apply those factors remains the
same: authorization.61
B. Examples of Its Breadth
The problematic breadth of the CFAA can best be described
through examples. This is not a taxonomy but rather a collection of
difficult scenarios the courts have faced and hypothetical cases they
or scholars have proposed.
First are terms of service cases.62 These involve a person who
accesses a web platform, such as Facebook or LinkedIn, in violation
of a term of service that the person has not read or that is unclear.
Facebook, for example, prohibits a person from creating an account
with a fake name or joining if under thirteen years old.63 Courts and
scholars rightly point out it would be unfair to punish such a person
for accessing a computer without authorization when she did not
59. We can identify one slight difference: the definition of exceeds authorized access
includes the term “so,” when describing the information that the individual is not “so” entitled
to obtain. This “so” justifies distinguishing whether access is authorized based upon the
manner of access, as opposed to the nature of the information obtained, or the purpose the
individual has in obtaining it. The “so” might therefore mean that a business entity using
automated software to scrape the website of a competitor may have authorization to access
the competitor’s website manually, but not by means of an automated software. The manner
of access is arguably prohibited by the word “so” (assuming the terms of service or cease-and-
desist letter have prohibited that manner of access).
60. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 872 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (finding that the
defendant lacked “permission” to enter private area of public building); People v. Barnes, 41
N.E.3d 336, 339 (N.Y. 2015).
61. E.g., Bowman v. United States, 212 A.2d 610, 610-11 (D.C. 1965) (describing how the
defendant entered an area of the train station restricted to those with tickets).
62. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 466 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also Nosal I, 676 F.3d
at 861-62 (describing such scenarios in dicta).
63. Terms of Service, supra note 8.
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know she was violating the terms. Even if read, these terms of
service often do not clearly say that violating them results in
termination of authorization.64 Courts have rarely, if ever, found
liability for such facts,65 but both courts and scholars regularly use
this scenario as a central example of the potential problem with
reading “without authorization” literally.66
Second are purpose or misuse cases that often involve employees
on private systems rather than public web platforms. The Van
Buren case pending before the Supreme Court involves a police
officer who had permission to access a law enforcement database for
police business but used it for personal reasons.67 He had the right
to look up a license plate for a valid investigation but not to help a
friend, as he did.68 This access violates the rules for the database,
but only if we know the defendant’s purpose or later misuse of the
information.
The circuit courts are split on this issue. The Eleventh Circuit in
Van Buren held that the officer had violated the CFAA.69 By
contrast, the Second Circuit held that such wrongful purpose alone
does not trigger a violation of the CFAA. The case, the prominent
cannibal cop case in New York, involved a police officer who used his
access to a police database to look up a woman’s address so he could
follow her; again, he had valid access to the computer as an
employee but violated city policy by using that access for his own
purposes.70
Another common scenario under the purpose or misuse category
involves an employee who has permission to log on to his employer’s
computer but does so for the purpose of taking confidential business
64. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 466 (noting this ambiguity).
65. See id. at 451, 468 (refusing to find liability); Sandvig v. Barr, Civil Action No. 16-1368
(JDB), 2020 WL 1494065, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2020) (assuming no such cases), appeal
docketed, No. 20-5153 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2020); Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18-20
(D.D.C. 2018) (explaining that no convictions have resulted from a violation of terms of service
alone).
66. See Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 860-61; Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 466; Kerr, supra note 5, at 1659;
Bellia, supra note 5, at 1473.
67. United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct.
2667 (2020) (mem.).
68. Id. at 1206.
69. Id. at 1207-08.
70. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 511-13 (2d Cir. 2015).
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information so he can quit and start his own business with a client
list, for example.71 Here, too, courts will ask whether an employer’s
terms of service72 or even a state law duty of loyalty73 should suffice
to establish the access was without authorization.
These employee cases involving purpose or later use are often a
subset of terms of service cases—and sometimes conflated with
them74—because they do involve a violation of an employee manual
or other written rule or even norm. But they differ from the first
category of terms of service cases. A twelve-year-old who accesses
Facebook has no permission at all based upon her status. By
contrast, the officer or employee has permission to access for some
purposes based upon his status as an officer but not for the purpose
he actually has.
Third are scraping cases. These usually involve businesses that
write automated software that visits thousands, millions, or even
billions75 of webpages on another’s platform, or across the web, to
obtain data from those pages.76 A travel site might scrape data from
a competitor to determine how to set its prices competitively.77 In
hiQ Labs, the plaintiff scraped public-facing profile information
from LinkedIn.78 For millions of profiles, it obtained names,
employer information, education, and background to allow hiQ Labs
to create its own database it could package and sell.79
Consider a more recent and large-scale scraping case. A company
called Clearview AI has spent the last several years secretly
71. See Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 856.
72. United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1071-72, 1078 (1st Cir. 1997) (assuming
subsection (a)(2) was met when IRS employee accessed files not for business but for curiosity).
73. Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006).
74. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 860 (conflating the problem that an employee might not be aware
of a prohibition with the fact that the CFAA does not define prohibited purposes or uses at
all).
75. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-
facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/65KJ-XBTU].
76. Jacquellena Carrero, Access Granted: A First Amendment Theory of Reform of the
CFAA Access Provision, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 132 (2020); Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years
of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 373-
74 (2018).
77. Carrero, supra note 76, at 141.
78. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert.
filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2020).
79. Id.
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scraping platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Venmo, and Twitter
to gather three billion photos and their associated names.80
Clearview has developed sophisticated facial recognition algorithms
and quickly deployed its services to hundreds of law enforcement
agencies across the country.81 These police departments simply
upload the photo of a person caught on a surveillance camera, for
example, and Clearview AI returns the person’s name and other
information, including links to their social media accounts.82
Courts are split on how to handle scraping cases.83 But they often
focus on “without authorization” as the key to answering the
question and whether terms of service or an express cease-and-
desist letter suffice to establish the access was unauthorized. The
Ninth Circuit in hiQ Labs, for example, held that scraping the
public portions of a public site never violates the CFAA trespass
provision.84 For public sites such as LinkedIn, the “without authori-
zation” element does not apply.85
Fourth are password sharing cases. A person gains access to a site
validly, in the sense that she enters a password that works and with
the permission of the password/account holder, but in violation of
the terms of service of the platform or even in the face of a cease-
and-desist letter.86 Does this conduct violate the CFAA?
Finally, I conclude my nonexhaustive collection with firmware
pushing cases.87 These are interesting because the computer owner
is not a platform or business but rather an individual who owns a
smartphone or computer. For example, Apple pushed firmware to its
customers’ devices, an iOS update, that caused the phone to operate
more slowly to conserve battery time.88 If the device owner consents
to the download in general but not to the specific effects of the new
firmware, has Apple accessed the individual’s device without
authorization?
80. Hill, supra note 75.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Sellars, supra note 76, at 377.
84. hiQ Labs, Inc., 938 F.3d at 1003-04.
85. Id.
86. E.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2016).
87. In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 347 F. Supp. 3d 434, 452 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(collecting cases), on reconsideration in part, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
88. Id.
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II. AN UNDUE FOCUS ON “WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION”
Courts and scholars are right to treat criminalizing many of the
above scenarios as unjust. I turn now to their diagnosis of the
problem before turning to their proposed solutions. Both suffer from
an undue focus on the term “without authorization.”
A. A Misdiagnosis
Scholars89 and many courts90 point to the element “without
authorization” as the problem. To read the term broadly as embrac-
ing a violation of terms of service, for example, would criminalize
innocent conduct. The arguments almost all boil down to what they
call notice and what I will later address via mens rea.91 The
individual does not know her access is without authorization, and
it would be unfair or wrong to punish her. But scholars and courts
have shaped this basic point into numerous different legal argu-
ments.
First, they argue that the term “without authorization” is “un-
constitutionally vague.”92 This follows, they argue, because the term
fails to give fair notice as to when access is “without authoriza-
tion.”93 This is again the terms of service argument—a person
may not have read them. “Without authorization” has also been
deemed vague because a platform can change its terms of service,
and a user will be unaware of the change.94 Others argue “without
89. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 38, at 1648-49; Bellia, supra note 5, at 1443; Andrea M.
Matwyshyn & Stephanie K. Pell, Broken, 32 HARV.J.L.&TECH. 479, 486 (2019); Mayer, supra
note 3, at 1463 n.32 (collecting the “voluminous” scholarly critiques of the overbreadth and
broadness of the CFAA’s “without authorization” provision).
90. See, e.g., Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Drew, 259
F.R.D. 449, 466 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
91. See infra Part III.A.
92. See Kerr, supra note 38, at 1561-62.
93. See Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854; Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449; cf. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d
508, 540 (2d Cir. 2015). But see WEC Carolina Energy Sols. L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204
(4th Cir. 2012); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(explaining that “a personally-addressed cease-and-desist letter” helps to inform “[a] person
of ordinary intelligence” her “access was ‘without authorization’”).
94. See Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 862.
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authorization” could be premised upon a contract model.95 If a per-
son clicks “I agree” to terms she has not read, contract law makes
her bound by those rules.96 These arguments all represent elabor-
ations of the notice problem.
A variation on the terms of service problem arises under the
Seventh Circuit view that “without authorization” can be estab-
lished by state tort law, such as an employee’s duty of loyalty. In
International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, an employee quit and
was supposed to return a work laptop.97 The employee accessed the
laptop one last time to delete files for his own benefit and to the
company’s detriment.98 The court held that he accessed the laptop
without authorization, not because he had quit, but because at the
time he accessed the laptop, he was acting for his own benefit and
not the company’s.99 Doing so breached his duty of loyalty, and, at
that point, his agency with the company had terminated and with
it his authorization to access the computer.100
Courts and scholars criticize this case because an employee would
not be likely to know that his authorization had been terminated by
operation of law—because he was unaware of this state law duty of
loyalty or of its application to his conduct.101 Even though this case
involves state law, it is really just a notice case in the end and one
that we can later address with mens rea.
Even cases decided on other grounds or raising other issues get
dragged into the orbit of the supposed notice problem. For example,
in Nosal I, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the CFAA applies
to one who has the right to access a computer but later uses the
information obtained in violation of a term of service.102 The court
held that it does not.103 But the Ninth Circuit then found itself
95. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 1598-99.
96. Id.
97. 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006).
98. Id. at 419.
99. Id. at 420-21.
100. Id. at 420.
101. See WEC Carolina Energy Sols. L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2012);
Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (“What exactly is a ‘nonbusiness purpose’? If you
use the computer to check the weather report for a business trip? For the company softball
game?”).
102. 676 F.3d at 863.
103. Id.
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unnecessarily discussing at length the problem of terms of service
and notice in general, even beyond later misuse cases.104 Indeed, it
appeared to assert that such terms of service can never be the
premise for a finding that access was without authorization—a point
unnecessary to the actual holding that the CFAA does not apply at
all to the later misuse cases.105
Finally are two arguments not rooted in notice. Many argue that
it would be unfair for a platform to unilaterally impose conditions
for access because a violation of these conditions can lead to a
criminal charge.106 A private party appears to be enjoying the right
to decide what is criminal, and the state should not delegate this
power to a powerful business entity.107
As discussed below, the problem with this argument is that
ordinary criminal trespass laws afford private property owners,
including stores, malls, and parks, precisely this power to unilater-
ally impose conditions of entry, the violation of which will lead to
criminal charges.108 Therefore, this is an argument that we should
abolish the trespass provision, as I argue in the final Part of this
Article, and not a constitutional or even statutory interpretative
argument that “without authorization” can never rest upon terms
of conditions.
The term is also unconstitutionally vague, some argue, because
its breadth can lead to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.109
If terms of service are the predicate, for example, millions of
ordinary Americans are acting without authorization in their
routine computer use.110 Law enforcement could then pick and
choose among those millions which to prosecute, and there are no
guidelines to decide which to choose.111 To the extent this argument
arises out of unclear terms, a robust mens rea will fix the problem.
To the extent the argument rests merely upon the great number of
104. See id. at 861-62.
105. Id. at 862-63.
106. See Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private
Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 768-71 (2013).
107. See id.
108. See infra Part IV.E.
109. See Kerr, supra note 38, at 1562.
110. See Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 862-63; see also Note, supra note 106, at 755.
111. Note, supra note 106, at 768-70.
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people violating a law, it seems curious. Millions violate federal
marijuana laws in states where it is legal, and yet courts do not hold
those laws unconstitutionally vague simply because of their breadth
or even surprise.112 The argument as to the sweep of these laws
supports abolishing them, but their breadth alone does not render
them vague.
In the final Part of this Article, I focus directly on the unilateral
power of a property owner, real or virtual, to exclude for arbitrary
or discriminatory reasons. That Part shows that the Supreme Court
has never held such power renders trespass laws unconstitu-
tional—and certainly not unconstitutionally “vague.” That Part
therefore argues instead that this power to discriminate or other-
wise exclude arbitrarily is best seen as a reason to repeal the
trespass provision of the CFAA.
The foregoing focuses on terms of service, largely attacked
because a user might not be aware of them. But what about cease-
and-desist letters personally communicated to an individual or
business that then continues access? Some scholars argue even
these cease-and-desist letters are insufficient. Orin Kerr, for
example, has recently written that a site that opens itself to the
public cannot selectively block certain users; therefore, any access
by those users told to stay out is still authorized.113 Indeed, hiQ Labs
expressly held that a cease-and-desist letter could not establish that
access was unauthorized for a public platform such as LinkedIn.114
The court did not claim the letter failed to provide clear notice;
rather, it held that the public portions of a platform are simply
never protected by the CFAA.115
B. A Code-Based Solution?
Many scholars argue that the only way to fix the term “without
authorization” is to focus on it even more diligently, as opposed to
finding solutions elsewhere, such as in the statute’s mens rea
112. See United States v. Bramer, 832 F.3d 908, 909 (8th Cir. 2016); State v. Parker, No.
45502-1-II, 2015 Wash. App. LEXIS 2691, ¶ 15 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2015).
113. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1147.
114. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for
cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2020).
115. Id.
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provision. They urge us to define, or really redefine, “without
authorization” as follows: only by circumventing a code-based
barrier, such as a password gate, does an individual access the
computer without authorization.116 This rule, they argue, would
ensure that the intruder knows that she is accessing without
authorization, thus fixing the notice problem.117 In addition, they
argue, Congress intended the CFAA to criminalize hackers only,
those who “break” into the computer somehow.118
One leading scholar has described the code-based regime as the
dominant scholarly view.119 Though rejecting the theory, Jonathan
Mayer recently wrote that scholars have “coalesced around a theory
that liability should turn on circumvention of technical
protections.”120 The code-based theory comes in two main versions:
an original, broad version and a recent, more refined version, such
as that announced in hiQ Labs.121
1. The Original Code-Based Test
In its original, broad version, the code-based theory says that a
person’s access is “without authorization” only if it involved
“circumvention of code-based restrictions”122 In other words, absent
such a code-based breach, the access was always authorized. Such
a code-based breach also appears to suffice as a violation,123 though
116. See id.; Kerr, supra note 5, at 1600; Kerr, supra note 11, at 1164 ; Bellia, supra note
5; David J. Rosen, Limiting Employee Liability Under the CFAA: A Code-Based Approach to
“Exceeds Authorized Access”, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 737, 740 (2012).
117. Rosen, supra note 116, at 760-61.
118. Id. at 745-46.
119. Jonathan Mayer, The “Narrow” Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
A User Guide for Applying United States v. Nosal, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1644, 1656 n.60
(2016) (collecting articles and notes).
120. Id. at 1656.
121. See 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9,
2020).
122. Kerr, supra note 5, at 1600; see Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp.
2d 1025, 1036, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (interpreting the CFAA and California computer crime
law), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016); Bellia, supra
note 5, at 1457; see also Opperman v. Path, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(interpreting California computer crime law); NovelPoster v. Javitch Canfield Grp., 140 F.
Supp. 3d 954, 965-66 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing cases under California computer crime law and
relating history).
123. Power Ventures, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
592 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:571
some courts have recognized the code breach would suffice only if it
also violated some kind of term of service or norm.
2. The Refined Code-Based Test
The recent, refined version of the code-based regime limits the
type of code to password logins or some other technical method that
the target computer uses to authenticate the user.124 This authenti-
cation requirement appears to be a subset of code-based barriers
because it still asks whether the computer owner has erected a
“technical barrier.”125 But now the barrier must relate to authenti-
cating the person seeking access or constitute some other method of
breaking in.126 The test seems to boil down to a username and
password, or something analogous, that the intruder bypasses
either by stealing credentials or exploiting security flaws.127
In Kerr’s particular elaboration of this refined version of the code-
based test, the technical barrier must also be high and hard to
breach.128 A person who clears her cookies from her browser to visit
a site that limits visits does not count, nor does changing or
disguising one’s IP address.129 These are technical barriers, true, but
they are mere speed bumps that are easy to evade and, therefore,
should not count as barriers.130
3. hiQ Labs
The Ninth Circuit in hiQ Labs announced yet a third version of
the code-based regime. Following scholars, it held only information
or computers protected by a password type authentication gate en-
joy protection under the CFAA.131 Information on the public-facing
part of a public platform does not fall under the CFAA at all, and
124. hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 1003-04; Kerr, supra note 11, at 1164.
125. See hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 1003-04.
126. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1172 (“Exploits that circumvent authentication mechanisms
or otherwise ‘break in’ to systems are similarly unauthorized.”).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1147.
130. Id.
131. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for
cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2020).
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the term “without authorization” is, therefore, irrelevant to this
information.132
But parting ways with scholars, the Ninth Circuit in hiQ Labs
added a twist because it needed to harmonize its holding with
existing precedent. Once information is protected by the CFAA
through this code-based barrier, a person need not actually breach
that barrier to violate the CFAA.133 As to such private, protected
information, defying a cease-and-desist letter will suffice.134 There
is thus a mismatch between the test for whether information is
protected by the CFAA (a code-based test) and the test for whether
a person accessed that information without authorization (a non-
code-based test).
I will detail the facts, holding, and reasoning of hiQ Labs because
they recapitulate many of the scholarly arguments in favor of a
code-based regime. In addition, they capture one of the most
challenging types of cases—scraping cases—whose rule will apply
to the even more challenging Clearview AI scraping situation.
Finally, hiQ Labs represents the most recent case to address the
CFAA and its “without authorization” requirement.
In hiQ Labs, a startup company, hiQ Labs, used automated bots
to scrape public-facing data from millions of LinkedIn profiles,
“including name, job title, work history, and skills.”135 It packaged
this data in a new product it sold to other businesses.136 One of its
products, Keeper, would take the name of an employee of a given
company and, after scouring the public portions of LinkedIn, predict
whether she was likely to be recruited away.137 That information
would allow her current employer, hiQ Labs’ client, to make greater
efforts to keep her.138
LinkedIn sent hiQ Labs a cease-and-desist letter requiring it to
stop accessing LinkedIn’s computers.139 It also successfully blocked
132. Id.
133. See id. at 1002.
134. See id.




139. Id. at 992.
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hiQ Labs technologically.140 It was hiQ Labs, oddly, that sued
LinkedIn claiming it had a legal right to scrape the site under
California’s anticompetition laws.141 hiQ Labs argued LinkedIn
should not be allowed to prevent hiQ Labs from securing data to
create products to compete with LinkedIn, which also culled its own
data to sell similar products.142
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that hiQ Labs did have a
right under anticompetition laws to scrape LinkedIn’s site—albeit
as a preliminary holding under a preliminary injunction standard.143
But before the court reached this conclusion, it first had to deter-
mine whether hiQ Labs’ scraping violated the CFAA’s trespass
provision.144 The Court held that it did not.145
On the CFAA holding, the court expressly adopted part of Orin
Kerr’s test. It wrote that the CFAA protects private information
only.146 This information is “delineated as private” by a code-based
barrier.147 This barrier must be “an authentication requirement,
such as a password gate.”148 The internet is presumed open, and this
requirement “divides open spaces from closed spaces on the Web.”149
In applying this test, the Ninth Circuit found that LinkedIn’s
public-facing information is open to the public and does not require
a login to an account with a username and password to access.150
True, hiQ Labs’ access to LinkedIn’s computers was unauthorized
in the sense that LinkedIn objected and made hiQ Labs aware
through a personally communicated letter as well as modest
technological barriers.151 But “without authorization,” the court
held, applies only to sites or areas that require a login access and
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 995.
143. Id. at 996.
144. Id. at 999.
145. Id. at 1003-04.
146. Id. at 1001.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Kerr, supra note 11, at 1161).
149. Id. (quoting Kerr, supra note 11, at 1161).
150. Id. at 1003-04.
151. Id. at 992.
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never applies to the public portion of a public site.152 For public sites
such as LinkedIn, the “concept of ‘without authorization’ is inapt.”153
But hiQ Labs has a second aspect of its holding: the mismatch
noted above between the test for what gets protection and the test
for what counts as a violation. I address this nuance more fully in
the next Section, in which I also pull back to observe more generally
just how complicated the case law is. I do so to show how my
proposed shift in focus to mens rea greatly simplifies the analysis.
C. Complex Case Law
A focus solely on the element of “without authorization” has
generated unnecessarily complex case law. First, there is a circuit
split over whether terms of service can ever establish unauthorized
access154 and a split in authority for a cease-and-desist letter.155 Kerr
has grouped the case law into three categories as it defines “without
authorization,”156 and Bellia has grouped it into five.157 Some courts
are beginning to require some code-based hack,158 whereas others at
least suggest it will be sufficient.159
Even within the Ninth Circuit, the interplay of four key and
widely cited cases—Nosal I,160 Nosal II,161 Power Ventures,162 and
hiQ Labs163—has created confusion and undue complexity. The rule
152. Id. at 1003-04.
153. Id. at 1002.
154. Compare Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting terms of service as
a basis for unauthorized access), with EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 64
(1st Cir. 2003) (suggesting in dicta that terms of service suffice), with United States v. Valle,
807 F.3d 508, 526 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding the statute is ambiguous and applying the rule of
lenity), with Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying
state duty of loyalty law for employees and agency theory).
155. Compare hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 1003-04, with Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F.
Supp. 2d 962, 969-70 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
156. Kerr, supra note 5, at 1628.
157. Bellia, supra note 5, at 1444-46.
158. See hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 1003-04; Sandvig v. Barr, Civil Action No. 16-1368 (JDB),
2020 WL 1494065, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-5153 (D.C. Cir. May
28, 2020).
159. See Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 858.
160. 676 F.3d 854.
161. United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016).
162. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2016).
163. 938 F.3d 985.
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appears to be this: the public portion of a public site can never be
the scene of unauthorized access (itself an astounding proposition)
under hiQ Labs, no matter what steps the host site takes or how
clearly and personally it communicates the ban.164
But what are the rules for information, areas, or accounts that do
require some kind of access authentication, such as a username and
password? Nosal I suggests in dicta that a violation of terms of
service or even a cease-and-desist letter is never enough; some code-
based hack must occur.165 But Power Ventures did permit a cease-
and-desist letter to establish the access was unauthorized without
a code-based hack.166 Indeed, Power Ventures had the express
permission of the individual account holders to access their account
using their passwords; their access was unauthorized because
Facebook had expressly told them so.167
In Nosal II, the court held the defendant’s access was completely
without authorization under the CFAA’s plain meaning because he
had been told he could no longer access the computers.168 He too did
not use a code-based hack, but rather borrowed a password of a
legitimate employee; nevertheless, his access was unauthorized
because it was revoked after he left their employ.169
The Ninth Circuit placed particular and repeated emphasis on the
plain meaning of “without authorization,” arguing at length it was
unambiguous and applied to anyone told to stay out.170 This was
precisely the situation in hiQ Labs—the company was expressly told
to stay out—and yet that was not enough to establish that access
was without authorization under the plain meaning.171
hiQ Labs thus appears to contradict Nosal II and Power Ventures.
hiQ Labs attempted to harmonize them as already sketched
above.172 To reiterate, when an area or information is protected by
164. Id. at 1003-04.
165. 676 F.3d at 862-63.
166. 844 F.3d at 1069.
167. Id. at 1068.
168. 844 F.3d 1024, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2016).
169. See id.
170. Id. at 1034 (“[W]e consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the words ‘without
authorization.’”).
171. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 999 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for
cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2020).
172. See supra Part II.B.3.
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a code-based barrier, such as a login, that barrier delineates the
information as private and at least eligible for “without authoriza-
tion” protection.173 The code-based test does not mean that breach-
ing the password is the only way in which a person might access
information without authorization.174 Rather, for such private
information, a cease-and-desist letter will suffice to establish that
any further access is unauthorized.175
The Ninth Circuit’s mismatch makes its test different from
Kerr’s, from whom it borrowed. Kerr requires that the test and
violation match.176 The information must be protected by an
authentication barrier and the intruder must bypass that barrier.177
For Kerr, a cease-and-desist letter would not suffice even for such
private information.178
The case law is confusing.
D. Dissenting Voices
Not all scholars support a code-based solution or even agree that
terms of service or cease-and-desist letters are fundamentally
insufficient.179 Some argue the code-based regime introduces its own
uncertainty and vagueness.180 After all, the code-based regime
parallels the same standard for the Digital Millenium Copyright Act
(DMCA), which expressly adopts a code-based test in the statute.181
The case law applying this test for the DMCA has struggled with
whether certain barriers, such as blocking IP addresses, count.182
These latter struggles apply equally to the code-based test under the
CFAA.183
173. hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 1001.
174. See id. at 1002.
175. See id.
176. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1164.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 119, at 1647 (arguing we should focus on use versus access
instead as a way to “narrow” the reach of the CFAA).
180. See, e.g., Annie Lee, Algorithmic Auditing and Competition Under the CFAA: The
Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and Authorization, 33 BERKELEY TECH.L.J. 1307,
1317-18 (2018). 
181. Id. at 1317.
182. Id. at 1317-18.
183. Id.
598 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:571
James Grimmelmann argues we need not limit the term “without
authorization” to code-based hacks for a different reason.184 In his
view, it is permissible to find someone liable even for terms they
only should have been aware of.185 “Without authorization” can be
viewed as a legally constructed term.186 Something can be “without
authorization” as a matter of law if a court believes it should be, or
more likely should not be, based on policy.187
A few scholars have pointed to the statute’s mens rea, arguing
that it can eliminate those problematic terms of service cases. But
many of these scholars argue for the far lower negligence standard
of “should have known”188 rather than knowingly. Their negligence
standard robs the mens rea of its power to exclude the unjust cases.
We appear to be left with a somewhat small group of scholars who
have recognized the full potential of a mens rea of knowingly.
William Hall, Jr. has provided the most in-depth argument for why
prosecutors must prove the defendant knew about the restriction in
exceeding authorized access cases.189 But even he largely limits
himself to the argument over whether an individual’s purpose in
accessing the computer should matter rather than the larger ques-
tion addressed here concerning mens rea in all contexts.190
Kerr does point to the CFAA mens rea as “critical” and recognizes
how a mens rea of intent can carve out some of the unjust applica-
tions of the CFAA.191 Nevertheless, he underestimates the potential
of the CFAA’s mens rea. For example, he argues that the CFAA’s
184. James Grimmelmann, Consenting to Computer Use, 84 GEO.WASH.L.REV. 1500, 1501
(2016).
185. See id. at 1511-12.
186. See id. at 1501, 1514.
187. See id. at 1501.
188. See, e.g., Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 17, at 1478-79 (defining mens rea in the
CFAA as “knew or should have known”); Bellia, supra note 5, at 1470 (“knows or has reason
to know”); Michael S. Dorsi & Keenan W. Ng, Computer Criminal Intent, 51 U.S.F. L. REV.
469, 501 (2017) (“know ... or should have reason to know”). David Thaw appears to argue that
the CFAA’s text, at least as interpreted by the courts, requires no mens rea for the term
“without authorization” at all. David Thaw, Criminalize Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing
the CFAA Intent Requirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 945 (2013). He suggests
rewriting the statute to expressly include a mens rea that the defendant “reasonably should
have known” her access was without authorization, though he later appears to argue for a
mens rea of “intent” or “actual notice.” Id. at 910-11, 945-46.
189. See Hall, supra note 17, at 1531.
190. See id. at 1524-25.
191. See Kerr, supra note 11, at 1180-82.
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mens rea likely does not afford a mistake of law defense that would
allow a defendant to argue she did not understand that the
operation or interpretation of some other law would render her
access without authorization.192 But Rehaif, which the Supreme
Court decided in 2019 and since Kerr’s argument, held that a mens
rea of knowingly will afford a defendant precisely this defense.193
* * * 
In sum, courts and scholars have focused too much on the term
“without authorization.” In their effort to limit the unjust applica-
tions of the CFAA, they have contorted this term, ignored its plain
meaning, and substituted a code-based test that does not rest on the
text, the legislative history, or the analogy to trespass that controls.
III. THE CFAA AS A CRIMINAL LAW
I argue that we should treat the CFAA more thoroughly as a
criminal law and that we shift our focus from “without authoriza-
tion” to the statute’s mens rea. This Part first demonstrates how
this proposal will map onto specific facts, creating a more natural
division that follows the elements of the statute.
Next, the Part shows why a mens rea of knowingly must apply to
the “without authorization” element. This simple point has eluded
many courts and scholars but is amply supported by the text, case
law, and legislative history. That same legislative history supports
an enhanced mens rea of knowingly.
This Part then shows why knowingly affords a type of mistake of
law defense for defendants who do not understand that some other
law or policy renders their access “without authorization”—a
potentially very powerful defense. A proper application of a robust
mens rea will sideline many of the unjust applications of the CFAA.
But since some large categories will remain, this Article will later
argue for repealing the provision.
192. See id. at 1181 (“The usual rule, however, is that a knowledge or intent requirement
for a criminal element requires knowledge or intent about the facts that are legally relevant
to the element rather than to a legal status the element implies.”).
193. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).
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A. A More Natural Division
A shift of focus to mens rea will simplify the analysis of these
cases by dividing the inquiry among elements of the statute more
naturally and efficiently. Under my view, “without authorization”
means, at a minimum, that the computer owner subjectively does
not want the visitor to access her computer. Its meaning could
theoretically also require that the computer owner have communi-
cated this desire.194 Indeed, courts and scholars currently load up all
the communicative aspect of the statute onto the term “without
authorization,” greatly confusing the case law.195
A mens rea of knowingly will subsume whatever communicative
aspect “without authorization” itself contains. Courts can, therefore,
safely define “without authorization” subjectively and in a very
targeted manner. In other words, in applying the statute to a given
case, courts will determine whether the computer owner subjectively
desired to keep the defendant out—that is, whether the access was
without authorization. When assessing the defendant’s mens rea,
courts will assess whether he knew of this desire. How well the
subjective desire of the computer owner was actually communicated
to the defendant will rest entirely in the mens rea department.
This new division of mapping the facts of a given case to the
elements of the crime will greatly simplify the analysis and help
identify the difficult questions concerning the CFAA that remain.
For example, even if a computer owner desires to keep a person out
and that person knows it, the CFAA may not prohibit the person’s
conduct, because the conduct does not meet some other element,
such as “access” (versus use).196
194. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding that Power Ventures acted “without authorization” and violated the CFAA “only after
it received Facebook’s cease and desist letter and nonetheless continued to access Facebook’s
computers without permission”).
195. See supra Part II.A.
196. See, e.g., Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding the CFAA applies to
unauthorized access, not unauthorized later use of information obtained). The Ninth Circuit
in Nosal I became so distracted by its reflections on the possible injustices of the CFAA by
focusing on the meaning of “without authorization” that it obscured its far simpler holding
that the CFAA does not prohibit later misuse whether by terms of service or otherwise. See
id. at 863-64.
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B. A Mens Rea of Knowingly
The CFAA requires a mens rea of knowingly with respect to
whether an individual’s access to the computer was “without
authorization.” The intruder must not only know that she is
accessing the computer, but also know that she does not have
authorization. This follows from the text, court precedent concerning
the CFAA, Supreme Court precedent concerning statutory interpre-
tation, and the legislative history of the act.
The argument proceeds in three main steps. First, the text
contains a mens rea term, “intentionally,” which applies to every
element of the statute, including the term “without authoriza-
tion.”197 Second, when one applies the mens rea “intentionally” to
“without authorization,” it collapses into the mens rea of knowingly.
This follows because “without authorization” is an attendant
circumstance. Third, a mens rea of knowingly must apply to
“without authorization” because recent Supreme Court precedent
requires that standard to apply to any element that divides innocent
conduct from unlawful conduct.
1. Step One
The term “intentionally” applies to each element of the statute,
including the term “without authorization.” First, ordinary rules of
English syntax tell us that “intentionally” modifies both “access”
and “without authorization” because no break comes between the
terms.198
The Supreme Court has often relied upon this simple understand-
ing of English syntax in holding that a mens rea term applies not
only to the conduct element that immediately follows, but also to
those other elements that round out the statute. Indeed, the Court
held recently that “[a]s a matter of ordinary English grammar, we
normally read the statutory term ‘knowingly’ as applying to all the
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
198. Cf. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650 (2009) (“In ordinary English,
where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such
as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject performed
the entire action.”).
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subsequently listed elements of the crime.”199 By contrast, when a
legislature wants to cut off the force of a mens rea term, it might
compose the language like this: “intentionally access a computer
and that access is without authorization.”
Second, the interpretative tools of the Model Penal Code tell us
that “intentionally” should apply to every element, including
“without authorization.” The Model Penal Code simply says that if
the statute contains a mens rea term, it applies to every element
unless grammatically differentiated or a contrary purpose plainly
appears.200 No such differentiation or contrary purpose appears
here. Again, in Rehaif, the Court took the same approach, quoting
expressly this Model Penal Code principle.201
Now federal criminal law does not always rely upon the Model
Penal Code for its drafting or interpretation, but the CFAA did. The
House Report accompanying the original 1984 legislation fashioned
its definition of “knowingly” upon the Model Penal Code and
expressly said it was doing so with respect to a part of that defini-
tion.202 It also expressly relied upon the Model Penal Code for the
specific intent element of the fraud provision.203
The House Report accompanying the 1986 amendments similarly
follows the Model Penal Code,204 and the Senate Report does so im-
plicitly.205 Those amendments included the substitution of the mens
rea term “intentionally” for “knowingly” in the trespass provision.206
The House Report defines “intentionally” the same as the Model
Penal Code, noting that the “term ‘purposely’ in the Model Penal
199. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019) (internal quotations omitted).
200. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (AM. L. INST. 1962) (when a statute “prescribes the
kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing
among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements
of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears”).
201. See 139 S. Ct. at 2195.
202. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 16-17 (1984) (“This follows the practice of the proposed
Model Penal Code (section 2.02(7)).”).
203. Id. at 17, 20 (“The Committee intends that the term ‘with the intent’ have the same
culpable state of mind as the term ‘purpose’ as used in the proposed Model Penal Code
(§ 2.02).”).
204. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 9-10 (1986).
205. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 5-6 (1986) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1396, at 33 (1980))
(discussing MPC definition of “knowingly” contained in House report).
206. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2(a)(1), 100 Stat. 1213,
1213.
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Code is the equivalent of ‘intentional’ in the proposed code.”207 It
also justifies substituting this new mens rea based upon the Model
Penal Code’s more prosecution-friendly definition of “knowingly.”208
Finally, in the 1970s and early 1980s, Congress began to consider
adopting the Model Penal Code culpability standards as part of a
much broader criminal law reform effort.209 It held numerous
hearings210 and in 1980, the House Judiciary Committee produced
a report summarizing a proposal to move almost entirely to the
Model Penal Code approach for mens rea.211 That larger effort never
became law.212 But the CFAA in 1984 was part of a much larger
omnibus criminal law reform bill that did in part arise out of that
larger reform effort. Both the House213 and Senate214 Committee
Reports for the 1986 amendments liberally quote from a 1980 House
Judiciary Committee Report that contained the full proposal for a
Model Penal Code approach.215
The Supreme Court has apparently followed these breadcrumbs.
By 1980, the Court noted this general change from the common law
mens rea approach to the Model Penal Code approach.216 Rehaif
expressly relied upon the Model Penal Code in noting that a mens
rea term should apply to all elements unless a contrary purpose
appears.217 Rehaif, in turn, interpreted a 1986 federal criminal law
that itself arose during this larger federal criminal law reform
effort.218
207. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 9-10.
208. See id. at 5.
209. See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L.REV.45, 97-98, 101 (1998); William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State
Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 LAW&SOC’YREV. 741, 749 (1993).
210. Lofquist, supra note 209, at 749.
211. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1396 (1980).
212. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 943, 949 (1999).
213. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 9-10.
214. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986).
215. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1396.
216. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-04 (1980); United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978).
217. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019).
218. See id. at 2194.
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2. Step Two
When the mens rea term “intentionally” is applied to the element
“without authorization,” it collapses into knowingly. This follows
directly from ordinary Model Penal Code interpretative rules.219 The
element “without authorization” is an attendant circumstance,
primarily because it is neither the conduct of the statute (“access”)
nor any proscribed result.
Plus, “intentionally” in the sense of “purposely” makes no sense
for an attendant circumstance such as “without authorization,” and,
therefore, it must collapse into knowingly. That is, we do not require
that the person wanted her access to be unauthorized, simply that
she knew it was. True, one could imagine hackers who do con-
sciously want their access to be unauthorized—those who hack into
a Pentagon website might do so for the challenge because they are
excluded. But common sense tells us the CFAA is not limited to
hackers who hack only for the challenge and not, for example,
money.
3. Step Three
Supreme Court precedent also shows that the mens rea for
“without authorization” in the CFAA should be knowingly for a
separate, but critical, reason. The Court has repeatedly held that
when a federal criminal statute contains a mens rea of “knowingly,”
it applies to every element that divides criminal from innocent
conduct.220 For example, child pornography laws prohibit the
knowing possession of an image that depicts the sexual conduct of
a minor.221 The Court requires “knowingly” to apply not only to the
possession of an image, but also knowledge that the person depicted
219. See H.R.REP.NO. 99-612, at 10 (1986) (“The term ‘purposeful’ in the Model Penal Code
is the equivalent of ‘intentional’ in the proposed code.”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. L.
INST. 1962) (providing that “purposely” defaults to “knowingly” for attendant circumstances).
220. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2195; United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72
(1994) (“[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the
statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.”); see Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1994).
221. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a).
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is a minor and that they are engaged in sexual activity.222 This
follows, the Court reasoned, because without the element of a
“minor,” for example, the person knowingly possesses adult por-
nography and such possession is not a crime.223
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the mens rea
under the CFAA, but the above test applies in a straightforward
manner. Under the CFAA, the element of “without authorization”
is necessary to transform innocent conduct (merely accessing a
computer) into criminal conduct (doing so without authorization).
Therefore, the existing mens rea term of “intentionally” must apply
to “without authorization”—though again, it collapses into know-
ingly.
Finally, a clarifying note: the CFAA also criminalizes “exceed[ing]
authorized access” as an alternative to access “without authoriza-
tion.”224 I have already argued that the test for this alternative is
the same as for access “without authorization.”225 As for mens rea,
the same principles from above apply. The force of the term “inten-
tionally” continues to apply to all later elements unless a contrary
purpose plainly appears, and none does here. In addition, the
exceeding authorized access element—which prohibits one from
obtaining files that he is not entitled to obtain—would be the only
element separating innocent from criminal behavior. Under the line
of Supreme Court cases referenced above, this “exceeding” element
also requires that the mens rea of knowingly apply.226 Finally, in the
House Report from 1984, Congress said that the mens rea for the
element that ultimately became “exceeding authorized access” was
“knowingly.”227
Unfortunately, lower courts construing the CFAA in particular
pay little heed to the mens rea in this context. Some have applied
the negligence standard of “has reason to know.”228 Others, such as
222. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78.
223. See id. at 72-73.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
225. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
227. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 2-3, 20 (1984).
228. See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 273 (5th Cir. 2010).
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Nosal I, have treated the statute as having no apparent mens rea
based merely upon its voluminous illustrations.229
C. An Enhanced Knowingly
In 1986, Congress made clear that it sought a mens rea that was
a heightened version of “knowingly” as applied to “without authoriza-
tion.”230 In the original 1984 statute, Congress used the mens rea
term “knowingly.”231 In doing so, it expressly intended the somewhat
watered-down version of “knowingly” contained in the Model Penal
Code and elsewhere in criminal law. This watered-down “know-
ingly” included the mens rea of “practically certain,” Congress said
in its legislative report.232 This “knowingly” also included “willful
blindness.”233 This latter term means a person might merely be
aware of the probability, or high probability, that a fact is true and
yet be deemed to meet the mens rea of “knowingly” if she ignored
facts that would lead to knowledge.234
In 1986, Congress amended the statute and substituted “inten-
tionally” for “knowingly” as the mens rea.235 As noted above, under
ordinary circumstances, this change should not really create a
change with respect to “without authorization” because “intention-
ally” collapses into knowingly when applied to a circumstance rather
than to conduct.236 What did Congress hope to accomplish, then, by
substituting “intentionally”?
The legislative report for the 1986 amendment is not entirely
clear, but it appears Congress wanted to want to rule out any
watered-down versions of knowingly. It refers to the new standard
as “a slightly higher state of mind standard ... than ‘knowingly.’”237
229. Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). But see id. at 864, 866 (Silverman, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing for a mens rea of “knowingly”).
230. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 2 (1986).
231. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190.
232. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 17, 20 (1984).
233. Id. at 16-17, 20.
234. Id.
235. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2(a)(1), 100 Stat. 1213,
1213.
236. See supra Part III.B.2.
237. H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 6-7 (1986).
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For example, the report notes that “knowingly” includes not only to
“know” but also to be “practically certain.”238 The report says Con-
gress wanted to rule out the alternative of “practically certain.”239 In
other words, it wanted to define “knowledge” as “certain.”
The report also says that it substituted “intentionally” to limit
prosecutions to those who have “clear intent to” access, “without
[proper] authorization,” the files or data of another.240 Finally, the
new mens rea in the 1986 amendment to the CFAA appears to rule
out the lower version of “knowingly” that can be met by “willful
blindness.”241 The House Report for the original law states that
“willful blindness” would have sufficed to meet the “knowingly”
standard.242 The new mens rea of “intentionally” appears to be
intended to eliminate this “willful blindness” version of “knowingly”
just as much as it eliminates “practically certain.”
D. Mistake of Law
The federal mens rea of knowingly in the CFAA will also afford
defendants a species of mistake of law defense that will rule out an
entire class of potentially unjust cases. The leading example of this
type of unjust case is Citrin.243 There, the Seventh Circuit held that
an employee who uses his work computer for personal reasons
adverse to his employer’s interests, rather than for work reasons,
breached his state law duty of loyalty.244 This breach of a separate
state law revoked his authorization to access his employer’s
238. Id. The Report includes an explanation that muddies the waters. It appears motivated
to protect insiders who enjoy authorized access but then “stumble into” unauthorized files by
“mistake[ ].” See id. at 10. One could argue Congress intended the new, enhanced mens rea
to apply to “exceeding authorized access” cases only. But regardless of its original motivation,
the new mens rea textually applies to both alternatives, “without authorization” and “exceeds
authorized access.” It would be difficult to interpret the “intentionally” differently for each.
239. See id. at 9-10.
240. Id. at 70; see also Thaw, supra note 188, at 914 (noting the heightened mens rea and
that courts have unfortunately “whittled away” this protection).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
242. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 16-17, 20 (1984) (cross-referencing the mens rea for the
counterfeit device provisions of the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1984).
243. Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
244. Id. at 420.
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computer.245 The defendant was held liable even though he did not
know about this separate state law or its effect on his access
rights.246
The Ninth Circuit in Nosal I correctly parodied this holding. It
asked, sarcastically, whether an employee who uses his work
computer to check the weather for “the company softball game”
violates this duty of loyalty and thus exposes himself to prosecution
under the CFAA.247 This cannot be the law, the Nosal I court
declared.248 Therefore, the court concluded that terms and condi-
tions, or even other state laws, can never be the premise for a CFAA
violation.249
We can agree with the complaint in Nosal I without accepting its
overbroad solution because a mens rea of knowingly solves the
problem. It solves the problem by including the type of mistake of
law defense that means such an employee cannot violate the CFAA.
This hypothetical employee surely does not know that breaching the
duty of loyalty by looking up the weather would lead, by operation
of law, to a revocation of his access rights.
Criminal law traditionally denies defendants a mistake of law
defense if his mistake or ignorance is about the very law under
which he is prosecuted.250 That is, a defendant cannot claim he was
unaware of or mistaken about the CFAA itself. But the mens rea of
knowingly does supply a mistake of law defense about a separate
law that determines whether an element of the criminal law is met.
In this case, the mens rea of knowingly means that the prosecution
must show that a defendant knows about any separate law that
determines whether access is “without authorization” and must
understand its application to his conduct.
The Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States held that the mens
rea of “knowingly” in the federal statute at issue includes exactly
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
248. See id. at 862-64.
249. See id.
250. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (discussing voluminous case
law on the issue while recognizing a term of “willfully” can sometimes afford a mistake of law
defense).
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this type of mistake of law defense.251 I consider Rehaif here in some
detail because the Supreme Court interpreted a law that closely
resembles the CFAA and the facts of the case make this resem-
blance clear.
In Rehaif, the defendant “entered the United States on a
nonimmigrant student visa.”252 He did poorly in school and received
notification that he would lose his visa because of his poor grades if
he did not transfer to another school.253 At some point after receiv-
ing this notification, he went to a firing range to fire guns.254
Rehaif was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of federal gun
possession as an “alien” in the United States “illegally or unlaw-
fully.”255 At trial, he argued the prosecution must prove not only that
he was here unlawfully, but also that he knew he was here unlaw-
fully.256 The trial judge disagreed and the jury convicted.257
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.258 In doing so, it made
several holdings directly relevant to the CFAA. First, as noted
above, it held that the mens rea term “knowingly” applies to the
element “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.”259
Once it applied “knowingly” to the element of being in the United
States “unlawfully or illegally,” the Court explained that this mens
rea term affords a type of mistake of law defense.260 It does not
afford a mistake of law defense as to the federal criminal gun law,
but it does afford one as to the immigration law that would tell a
defendant whether he was in the United States “illegally or unlaw-
fully.”261 Under that law, the prosecution must prove that a
defendant understood that a separate immigration law made his
presence unlawful.262
251. 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194, 2198 (2019).






258. Id. at 2195.
259. Id. at 2198.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 2200.
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The Rehaif facts and law closely parallel the CFAA. The gun law
bans conduct if undertaken by a person present in the United States
“unlawfully.”263 The CFAA bans conduct—access to a com-
puter—undertaken without authorization.264 The gun law requires
that an individual understand how a separate law—the immigration
law—determines whether he is in the country lawfully.265 Therefore,
the CFAA should require, in a case such as Citrin, that prosecutors
prove the defendant knew that a separate law, such as the state tort
duty of loyalty, renders his access without authorization.266
IV. LESSONS FROM STATE CRIMINAL TRESPASS
This Part draws lessons from ordinary state criminal trespass
statutes and case law to shed light on the CFAA. It first shows why
Congress intended courts to look to these sources. It then shows how
criminal trespass supports a mens rea of knowingly and, indeed, an
enhanced mens rea that requires “personally communicated” notice
for public places.
On the one hand, as I then show, the criminal trespass cases
make clear that “without authorization” means what it says—“keep
off.”267 Criminal trespass cases afford property owners, even of
public places, great power to unilaterally and selectively exclude
whomever they wish, even as courts sometimes acknowledge the
potential injustice of such a property-preferring regime. Courts in
these ordinary criminal trespass cases have uniformly rejected the
argument that the term “without authorization” or its synonyms are
unconstitutionally vague.
On the other hand, this plain meaning view of the CFAA produces
normatively undesirable results. It is the best interpretation of the
statute, I argue, but also a reason to abolish it. I return to the
trespass cases in the final Part of this Article to glean more lessons
from historical trespass cases. These cases involve overt racial
discrimination and illustrate the underlying injustices of the crime
263. Id.
264. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
265. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2198.
266. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006).
267. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
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of trespass and why we should not expand its ambit to criminalize
virtual trespass, as the CFAA currently does.
A. Why Criminal Trespass?
The congressional committee reports repeatedly state that they
are enacting a computer trespass statute that should be viewed as
akin to ordinary trespass. The House Report for the original 1984
law noted the problem of hackers who “access (trespass into)”
computers.268 The legislation would address a “flurry of electronic
trespass[es].”269 Similarly, the 1986 House Report accompanying the
amended legislation repeatedly referred to the misdemeanor offense
conduct as “trespass” or “computer trespass.”270 The Senate Report
repeatedly denotes the trespass provision not only as “trespass” but
also as “simple trespass,” which is a misdemeanor.271
Courts272 and scholars273 agree Congress intended to analogize to
“trespass” law. The Second Circuit summarized the consensus:
“Consequently, the legislative history consistently characterizes the
evil to be remedied—computer crime—as ‘trespass’ into computer
systems or data, and correspondingly describes ‘authorization’ in
268. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984).
269. Id.
270. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 10-11 (1986).
271. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 7 (1986).
272. See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1000 (9th Cir. 2019) (pointing
to the 1984 House Report that equates a hacker’s access to a “trespass into”), petition for cert.
filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2020); Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Congress
enacted the CFAA in 1984 primarily to address the growing problem of computer hacking,
recognizing that, ‘[i]n intentionally trespassing into someone else’s computer files, the
offender obtains at the very least information as to how to break into that computer system.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9)); Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp.
3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Congress thus viewed exceeding authorized access as the digital
equivalent of being allowed into a house but entering a room within it that the owner has
declared to be off-limits.”).
273. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 5, at 1617 (“[T]he available evidence suggests that
legislators mostly saw [computer crime] statutes as doing for computers what trespass and
burglary laws did for real property.”); Goldfoot & Bamzai, supra note 17, at 1494 (“By
incorporating the rules of physical trespass in the CFAA, Congress also incorporated the
relevant norms of trespass.”); Ric Simmons, The Failure of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act: Time to Take an Administrative Approach to Regulating Computer Crime, 84 GEO.WASH.
L. REV. 1703, 1711 (2016) (“In its original 1984 computer crime legislation, Congress ... only
focused on the crimes of ‘computer damage’ and ‘computer trespass.’”).
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terms of the portion of the computer’s data to which one’s access
rights extend.”274
Neither courts nor the legislative history expressly use the term
“criminal trespass.” They just use “trespass.” But it must be
contemporary criminal trespass statutes we analogize to for several
reasons.275
First, the CFAA is a criminal statute.276 Its trespass provision
imposes misdemeanor criminal liability just as most criminal
trespass statutes do.277
Second, the text of the CFAA precisely tracks the text of criminal
trespass statutes. For example, many states define criminal
trespass as knowingly entering “without authority,” “without au-
thorization” or when “not authorized.”278 The Model Penal Code279
and many other states, such as New York,280 use the synonym not
“licensed or privileged” to enter.281 Other states use other synonyms
for this element including “without permission,” and “without
effective consent.”282
State criminal trespass statutes thus all share practically the
same structure: (i) knowing entry, (ii) without authorization, (iii) to
a building or other structure. We can see how closely the CFAA
tracks this structure and meaning: (i) intentional access (ii) without
authorization (iii) to a computer.283
Remember, here and elsewhere, that it is the text of the CFAA,
of course, that governs. When the structure and actual language
274. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 525 (2d Cir. 2015).
275. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c).
276. Id. § 1030.
277. Id. § 1030(c)(2)(A).
278. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1501(2) (2020) (“not ... authorized”); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 810.08(1) (West 2017) (“without being authorized”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-21(b) (2019)
(“without authority”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-4(a)(1) (West 2020) (residential,
“without authority”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5808(a)(1) (West 2012) (“not authorized”); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 14:63(A) (2020) (“without express, legal, or implied authorization”); MISS. CODE.
ANN. § 97-17-97(1) (2013) (“without authority”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-159.12(a) (2020)
(“without authorization”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3705(a)(1) (2020) (“without legal
authority”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-119 (2019) (“without authority of law”).
279. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(1) (AM. L. INST. 1962).
280. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00(5) (McKinney 2020).
281. See LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2(a) (collecting statutes).
282. See id. (noting that terms like authorization, license, and privilege are basically the
same for purposes of criminal trespass).
283. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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of the text so precisely track criminal trespass statutes, that simi-
larity should garner far more attention than the legislative history,
even if that history did not support the text in showing that crimi-
nal trespass must be the analogy.
Third, it must be contemporary criminal trespass for the simple
reason that criminal trespass was not a crime at common law,
unlike larceny or burglary. The leading treatises of common law
crime do not mention “criminal trespass.”284 All made clear that
burglary was the primary crime that protected homes, and burglary
has many elements that differ substantially from trespass, includ-
ing breaking and entering and the specific intent to commit a felony
therein.285 Blackstone also recognized “forcible entry” to lands as a
crime, but it required “force, with violence, and unusual weapons”
and did not appear limited to or even chiefly concerned with
dwellings or other buildings.286 Not until the twentieth century did
state legislatures pass criminal trespass statutes similar to those
today.287
The legislative history also makes clear Congress’s intent to
analogize the CFAA to contemporary criminal law by repeatedly
referencing the Model Penal Code, as detailed above.288 In turn, the
Model Penal Code itself represents contemporary criminal law and
284. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES; 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
(1716).
285. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 284, at *270-71; 1 HALE, supra note 284, at 547-48; 1
HAWKINS, supra note 284, at 101.
286. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 284, at *171-72. It is true that the common law did allow
for indictable trespasses under certain circumstances as misdemeanors. See, e.g., Miller v.
Harless, 149 S.E. 619, 624 (Va. 1929); Henderson v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 708, 710
(1852). Courts would essentially elevate a tort trespass into a misdemeanor if that trespass
also threatened to breach the public peace. See, e.g., Miller, 149 S.E. at 624; Henderson, 49
Va. (8 Gratt.) at 710. For trespass to houses and other buildings, courts in England and the
early republic, as well as treatises, announced the same basic principle: a mere trespass would
remain a civil cause of action unless there was a breach of the peace as might be wrought by
force against the inhabitant or a potential for such a faceoff. See, e.g., Henderson, 49 Va. (8
Gratt.) at 710; R v. Storr (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1053, 1053 (KB); 1 HAWKINS, supra note 284,
at 141. Time and again courts insist upon the line between criminal and civil, relegating a
homeowner to civil remedies for trespass. See, e.g., Henderson, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) at 710; Storr,
97 Eng. Rep. at 1053; 1 HAWKINS, supra note 284, at 141.
287. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (citing statutes); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 221.2 cmt. at 85-86 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
288. See supra Part III.C.
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a focus on clear statutory crimes that give notice.289 Its overall
philosophy focused on elemental analysis: breaking a statute down
into its elements and determining what mens rea applied to each
element.290
B. Criminal Trespass—Mens Rea
A majority of states require that the person making entry knows
her entry is without authorization.291 New York’s statute makes a
person guilty of trespass who “knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully [without license].”292 Courts in New York,293 as else-
where,294 apply this “knowingly” element to the term “unlawfully,”
as well as to the term “enters.” That is, the prosecutor must show
the defendant knew her entry was without license.295 A standard
lower than knowledge is “exceedingly rare.”296
Many states also permit a type of mistake of law defense to the
extent that license or authorization depends upon interpretation of
some other law other than the trespass law itself, such as property
or contract law.297 These sources closely parallel the sources relied
upon in Rehaif v. United States, detailed above, in recognizing a
mistake of law defense.298 For example, a landlord who enters a
tenant’s residence may not know that state law does not afford him
authorization to do so under those circumstances; the entry is
without authorization, but not criminal trespass if the landlord does
not actually know this separate law.299
This defense makes sense. After all, license or authorization are,
in a sense, facts—a person says, “Get out.” License also requires
289. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(d), (2)(d).
290. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1436-37 (1968).
291. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2(c).
292. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 2020).
293. See, e.g., People v. Luke, 955 N.Y.S.2d 465, 469 (App. Div. 2012).
294. See, e.g., State v. Pugh, 357 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
295. Luke, 955 N.Y.S.2d at 469; LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2(c).
296. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2(c).
297. Id. § 21.2; see also State v. Fanger, 665 A.2d 36, 38 (Vt. 1995).
298. See supra Part III.D.
299. Cf. Fanger, 665 A.2d at 37-38 (finding property manager did know his entry was
unlawful based upon his wrongful purpose).
2020] CRIMINAL TRESPASS AND COMPUTER CRIME 615
some application of law in determining, for example, whether the
person who said “get out” was authorized by law to do so.
These observations about the mens rea for trespass cases provide
additional support for the proposition that the CFAA mens rea for
“without authorization” should be knowingly and that this standard
should afford a mistake of law defense. Congress borrowed terms
from criminal trespass laws for the CFAA, and it analogized the
CFAA to criminal trespass statutes in the legislative history. We
can therefore infer Congress intended an interpretation of the
CFAA’s mens rea to parallel that of criminal trespass statutes.
C. Enhanced Mens Rea
In addition, state criminal trespass statutes usually require an
additional element of notice, such as a fence or a sign that makes
clear that entry is unlawful.300 After all, community custom usually
provides implicit permission for a person to enter even private
places, such as a walkway up to a suburban home or the lobby of a
city apartment building.301 A fence or sign that says “no trespassing”
makes clear that the owner has overridden this implicit license.302
The sign also provides unambiguous clarity to support the finding
of mens rea. Defendants should be on particular notice, a high level
of evidentiary mens rea, before we will criminalize the simple act of
entering a place, particularly a quasi-public place, such as an
apartment lobby or public housing.303
Note, of course, that the requirement of a sign or a fence is in
addition to the requirement of the mens rea of “knowingly.”
Criminal trespass laws do not substitute the sign or fence for
“knowingly,” imposing any kind of “should have known” standard.
If the person fails to read the sign, or understand it, or does not
understand that the fence means keep out, the prosecution has not
300. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10(a) (McKinney 2020); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3503(b) (West 2020) (“defiant trespasser”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(2) (AM.L. INST.
1962) (same).
301. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (“A license may be implied from the habits of
the country.” (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922))).
302. State v. Merhege, 394 P.3d 955, 957, 959 (N.M. 2017).
303. People v. James, 902 N.Y.S.2d 293, 298 (Crim. Ct. 2010) (summarizing legislative
history and purpose of sign requirement and collecting cases).
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proved “knowingly.”304 Of course, the presence of a sign might lead
a jury to conclude that a particular defendant did, subjectively,
know her entry was unlawful.
For places open to the public, many criminal trespass laws
require an even higher version of “knowingly”: “personally communi-
cated” notice.305 In places that are open to the public, such as malls
or stores, or places that are actually public places, such as Amtrak
stations or government buildings, trespass statutes often require
express, face-to-face notice to a person that that person is banned
from entering in particular.306 These face-to-face notices are also
often required in cases in which the initial entry is lawful but the
person is demanded to leave. Before a person can be convicted of
trespass based on remaining only, the person must have been told
to leave face-to-face.307 Hawaii’s second degree trespass law requires
written notice to stay away from a business.308
New York’s criminal trespass statute became a model for other
jurisdictions and illustrates many of these general principles.309 The
statute makes it a mere violation—not a criminal offense—to
knowingly enter or remain unlawfully upon a building or real
property.310 The statute requires more to make it a crime. To
simplify, it requires either (i) a fence or other enclosure “designed to
exclude intruders,” (ii) a conspicuously posted sign setting forth the
rules for entry, or (iii) a personally communicated request to
leave.311
304. E.g., People v. Luke, 955 N.Y.S.2d 465, 469 (App. Div. 2012) (sign prominently posted
but court held defendant did not know his entry was in violation of the sign’s prohibition).
305. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-101(3)(B)(i) (2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00(5);
LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2(a) (collecting statutes).
306. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(10) (West 2020).
307. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00(5).
308. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-814(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2019) (A “‘reasonable warning or
request’ means a warning or request communicated in writing.”).
309. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10; see also State v. Lucio-Camargo, 18 P.3d 467, 470 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001) (noting influence of New York statute), vacated on other grounds, 52 P.3d 1056
(Or. 2002); MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 cmt. at 89 (“A large number of states have followed
the New York provision, which applies to one who ‘knowingly enters or remains unlawfully.’”)
(AM. L. INST. 1980).
310. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10.
311. Id. §§ 140.00, .05, .10.
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In addition, New York law presumes entry to any place open to
the public is licensed.312 It can only become trespass if the person
“defies a lawful order” from the owner “not to enter or remain,” and
this order must be “personally communicated” to the person.313
D. Personally Communicated Notice and the CFAA
We arrive at a fundamental question: should courts import or
read into the CFAA an additional requirement not actually in its
text? Specifically, for public platforms, should a defendant be shown
to have defied a personally communicated order to stay off the
platform before we deem his access to be knowingly without
authorization? I argue we should, though as with any judicial gloss,
the case is far from certain.
I provide three reasons to support the addition of a personally
communicated requirement for public platforms. First, it follows
Congress’s desire to establish an enhanced mens rea as shown in its
legislative history: a knowingly that is “clear” and rules out any
watered-down version. Second, as a policy matter, it addresses a
future that Congress did not foresee—public platforms analogous to
malls, parks, and stores. Third, some courts have already required
personally communicated notice in the form of cease-and-desist
letters, at least in dicta, but without linking the requirement to any
principle. My proposal would link this existing requirement, a cease-
and-desist letter, to the analogous existing requirement in state
trespass statutes. I elaborate on these three reasons below.
First, as detailed above, Congress in 1986 substituted “intention-
ally” for “knowingly” in order to create an enhanced version of
knowingly as applied to the term “without authorization.”314
Congress said it wanted it to be “clear” a defendant knew she was
accessing without authorization.315 We can, of course, leave it to
juries to determine based on the facts whether a prosecutor has
proved clear knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.
312. Id. § 140.00.
313. Id.
314. See supra Part III.C.
315. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 99-612, at 9-10 (1986).
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But state legislatures have concluded that the mens rea of
“knowingly” does not sufficiently protect individuals when it comes
to public places.316 These states concluded that it would be vastly
unfair to allow a person to be convicted of a crime for entering a
public place without personalized notice in addition to the mens rea
requirement that she knew her entry was unlawful.317 The notice
requirement serves as an objective, irreducible indicator that the
defendant truly knew.
Thus, it makes sense to add this same requirement to the CFAA,
as applied to public platforms. Like parks, malls, and stores, a
person accessing a public platform, even without logging in or
creating an account, may not truly believe her access is without
authorization, even if she is aware of some term of service that
prohibits her access. She may think, “Oh, they don’t really mean
that.” A cease-and-desist letter, addressed to her, prohibiting
further access, ensures she knows any such further access would be
without authorization. She now knows they do “really mean it,”
since they went to the trouble to create individualized notice. It
avoids unfairness and possible surprise that exists in malls, parks,
and web platforms alike.
One might ask, then, why did Congress not add a requirement of
a cease-and-desist letter in the text of the CFAA? The answer leads
to my second argument: Congress likely did not have in mind public
web platforms, such as LinkedIn or Facebook, in 1984 or 1986. Tim
Berners-Lee invented the web in 1989 and wrote its protocols in
1990;318 the web did not gain widespread use until later in the
1990s.319
Rather, Congress originally envisioned and enacted a CFAA that
applied to private computers and information, such as classified
information or financial data and government or bank computers,
only.320 It envisioned a paradigm in which an authorized user must
316. See supra notes 305-13 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 305-13 and accompanying text.
318. A Short History of the Web, CERN, https://home.cern/science/computing/birth-web/
short-history-web [https://perma.cc/UYF3-W3PV].
319. Id.
320. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 2102, 98 Stat. 2190, 2190-92.
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log into such a system using a password to gain legitimate access.321
Paradigmatically, at least, the CFAA protected such private
information and places only.
But in later years, Congress expanded the type of information and
computers far beyond these categories of private information and
places to include any information and any computer connected to
the internet.322 In doing so, it expanded, perhaps inadvertently, the
ambit of the CFAA to include public platforms, even though these
computers go beyond the original paradigm of a government or bank
computer containing only certain, private information.
My proposal—personally communicated notice—inserts what
Congress would have included had it foreseen public platforms
because it relied so directly on ordinary physical trespass cases. My
proposal also has a textual home: it arises naturally as an objective
protector of the existing mens rea element that is in the statute.
Finally, some courts have already required, perhaps in dicta, such
personally communicated notice. The Ninth Circuit in Power
Ventures held that a cease-and-desist letter was not merely
sufficient but also necessary to make the defendant’s intrusion
without authorization.323 Unfortunately, the court did not root this
requirement in any principle, such as borrowing from trespass law
or as a required element to safeguard the mens rea.324 We can
backfill that justification, however, and root it in the requirement
under many state criminal trespass laws requiring personally
communicated notice for public places.
Nosal II similarly relied upon an express revocation of the
defendant’s authorization.325 Nosal II is analogous to a trespass case
premised on “remaining” rather than the original “entry,” since the
defendant previously had authorization.326 It makes sense to impose
a requirement of personally communicated notice as one might in an
ordinary criminal trespass case that involves “remaining” rather
than “entering.”
321. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984).
322. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
323. 844 F.3d 1058, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2016).
324. Id.
325. 844 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016).
326. Id. at 1029.
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The justifications for requiring personally communicated notice
help to sketch its particulars. To do its job, a personally communi-
cated notice must be more than an automated pop-up from the
website; this method would fail to alert an individual that the
prohibition was personal and serious. Rather, the notice should
occur along a channel separate from the web session, such as a
postal letter.
In addition, the notice must not be conditional on purpose; rather,
it must be an unconditional termination of authorization.327 It
cannot simply repeat ambiguous terms of service that might say,
“You are forbidden by this notice if you continue to visit our site to
scrape data.” After all, it is unclear whether the CFAA even applies
to wrongful purpose cases. Instead, the notice must simply say, “You
may no longer access our site.” This unconditional ban parallels the
type of ban typical in real-world cases.328
E. Without Authorization
State criminal trespass law similarly affords us insights into the
plain meaning of the term “without authorization” and shows the
term is not unconstitutionally vague in the CFAA or in state
criminal trespass cases. It simply means that the property owner
does not want the individual there. For example, the commentaries
to the Model Penal Code section on criminal trespass noted a
common thread among the then-existing state laws: “unwanted
intrusion, usually coupled with some sort of notice.”329 Or, as Wayne
327. See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding
cease-and-desist letter valid under CFAA in part because it unconditionally prohibited the
defendant’s access “for any purpose”).
328. State v. Zimbelman, No. 111759, 2015 WL 4577693, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. July 24,
2015) (quoting the form Walmart uses for personally communicated notice: “This document
constitutes formal notice and warning that you are no longer allowed on Walmart property”
and the defendant’s written acknowledgment that he was “prohibited from entering Walmart
property”).
329. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 cmt. at 87 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
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LaFave puts it, the owner or agent has “forbid[den] ... entry.”330 An
early Supreme Court case said it means “keep off.”331
Many trespass statutes use the exact term, “without authoriza-
tion,” or synonyms such as without consent, license, or privilege.332
Trespass cases have also expressly held that “without authoriza-
tion” and its synonyms are not unconstitutionally vague.333 The
Supreme Court, speaking of a state trespass law, noted that “[t]here
is no lack of notice in this law, nothing to entrap or fool the un-
wary.”334 The Florida Supreme Court similarly concluded that the
term “authorized” in the trespass statute was not vague.335 The
court “conclude[d] that the challenged terms are of such common
understanding and usage that persons of ordinary intelligence are
fully able to determine what conduct is proscribed by the challenged
enactment.”336 The Georgia Supreme Court similarly held that its
state criminal trespass statute was not unconstitutionally vague
and that an officer’s warning to “stay out” constituted sufficient
notice.337
These state trespass cases also help us understand the layers of
presumptions with respect to licenses. The default for any visitor is
no license. To own property means to have the right to exclude, and
exclusion is assumed. But custom can override this presumption to
330. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2(a). (“[T]he [typical] rule as to private premises is that
the mere demand of the owner constitutes a lawful order for the purposes of the criminal
trespass statute, so that the reason for requesting removal is irrelevant.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
331. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (“Traditionally the
American law punishes persons who enter onto the property of another having been warned
by the owner to keep off.”).
332. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 42 (1966); Ahmed v. Rockefeller, 308 F.
Supp. 935, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); State v. Steinmann, 569 A.2d 557, 560 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990);
Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840, 843 (Fla. 1979), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Cohen v.
Katsaris, 530 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Fla. 1982). The federal district court in Cohen agreed with
the Florida Supreme Court that the term “authorized” was not unconstitutionally vague. 530
F. Supp. at 1094-95. It did rule, however, that the application of the term “structure” in the
statute to the defendant was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1096-97.
334. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 42.
335. Downer, 375 So. 2d at 843.
336. Id. On the other hand, some courts have held that trespass laws may implicate
vagueness concerns for government buildings apparently because these are not private
property and, therefore, directly involve First Amendment rights. E.g., City of Seattle v. Rice,
612 P.2d 792, 793 (Wash. 1980).
337. Rayburn v. State, 300 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ga. 1983).
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create a new one.338 A person who opens her store to the public
creates for all an implied license to enter.339
This implied license, in turn, can be revoked by the business
owner at any time and for any reason.340 She can keep her store
open to all the public except one person, and in most jurisdictions,
she can exclude that person for nearly any reason whatsoever
including race, at least under traditional trespass law, though civil
rights statutes supersede such discriminatory use of trespass law in
many but not all contexts.341 These straightforward trespass
principles often lead to unjust results;342 courts nevertheless stand
behind this plain meaning understanding of “without authoriza-
tion.”343
A relatively recent trespass case illustrates the foregoing. In
Alexis v. McDonald’s, after a Black customer and a white manager
argued over an order, the manager ordered the customer and her
family to leave.344 The family refused and took their food to a table
where they ate in apparent peace.345 The manager nevertheless
summoned an officer who told them they would be arrested if they
did not leave and, when they did not, arrested the mother.346 The
officer made a racist remark as he did so.347
A jury acquitted Alexis of trespass, and she then sued both the
manager and the officer for a violation of her civil rights.348 The
court held that the officer was potentially liable, but that the arrest
itself was based upon probable cause.349 The McDonald’s manager
338. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013).
339. E.g., State v. Paye, 865 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2015).
340. E.g., State v. Zimbelman, No. 111759, 2015 WL 4577693, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. July 24,
2015).
341. Alexis v. McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 350-51 (1st Cir. 1995). True,
some jurisdictions require the reason to be a condition that applies to all—much like a
platform’s terms of service. Id.
342. City of Greenville v. Peterson, 122 S.E.2d 826, 828 (S.C. 1961) (holding selective right
of private individual to exclude includes right to exclude based on race), rev’d on other
grounds, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (sidestepping private trespass law, finding state action, and
deciding the case under the Equal Protection Clause); see also infra Part VII.
343. Peterson, 122 S.E.2d at 828.
344. 67 F.3d at 345.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 345-46.
347. Id. at 346.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 348, 351.
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had an unfettered right to decide to exclude anyone she wanted as
long as it was not based on race, and in this case, the court held the
evidence was insufficient to show that the exclusion was based on
race.350
The court wrote, almost regretfully, that “Massachusetts
recognizes [no] exception to the seemingly absolute right of a private
business owner to withdraw, without cause, its implied license to
enter a business establishment.”351 I say “regretfully” because the
court said it scoured the precedents for some limit to the arbitrary
power to exclude.352
Consider the very trespass case cited by the Ninth Circuit in hiQ
Labs. In Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, a person entered a shopping
mall, an area open to the public.353 Normally he could enter like
anyone else, but the defendant had been banned with a written
order months before.354 The police arrested him for criminal
trespass, and the Ninth Circuit held that the arrest was valid as
against the claim the police lacked probable cause.355 The presump-
tion that a person enjoys a license to enter a public place had, for
Blankenhorn, been superseded by the ban to stay out.356 In the
words of the court, the ban transformed a place “open to the public,”
to one “not open to the public.”357
On the other hand, the Model Penal Code and some states do
provide some limits. These states allow an affirmative defense for
criminal trespass to a public place if the person had abided by all
the lawful conditions for entry imposed by the business.358
As an affirmative defense, this limit does not change the plain
meaning of “unauthorized.” Rather, it finds that even though the
entry is unauthorized, it cannot be criminalized because the
revocation of authorization is arbitrary. These statutes provide in
express language for such a policy outcome. Moreover, the law does
350. Id. at 351.
351. Id. at 350.
352. Id.
353. 485 F.3d 463, 468 (9th Cir. 2007).
354. Id. at 467-68.
355. Id. at 472-73.
356. Id. at 474.
357. Id. (citing Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1998)).
358. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2(a).
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not limit the types of conditions a property owner may impose (other
than that they be lawful). The conditions themselves can be
unilateral and arbitrary. These states’ trespass laws merely require
that the person ejected be banned because she violated those
conditions.
Trespass law thus affords property owners unilateral power to
decree who may enter and who may not, certainly by general terms
applicable to all and often on an individual, selective basis. Courts
agree that this arbitrary power, enlisting law enforcement to secure
a person’s removal, does not make the term “without authorization”
unconstitutionally vague—as long as a particular defendant knows
she cannot enter or must leave.
V. APPLIED TO CFAA CASES
One may gather the foregoing threads to summarize their lessons
for the CFAA. A mens rea of knowingly as applied to “without
authorization” eliminates a great many of the unjust cases.
Consider how much work knowingly does for terms of service, for
example. It requires a prosecutor to show that the defendant read
the terms of service, that she understood them, that she understood
that those terms applied to her conduct and prohibited her conduct,
and finally, that violating the term of service terminated her
authorization.
As a result, it is not enough that a person should have read the
terms of service, was aware of them, or was given specific notice
where to find them. It is not enough that she scrolled through them
and clicked “I agree” at the end. All of these facts might be enough
to bind one to a contract term, but they do not establish the
defendant knew of the terms of service. And even knowledge of the
terms is not enough.
Next, she must understand those terms and that they apply to
her conduct. An employer’s manual may restrict the use of a
computer to business tasks. To return to the example from Nosal I,
is “check[ing] the weather report ... [f]or the company softball game”
related to business?359 We need not answer this metaphysical
359. Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012).
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question because a prosecution cannot show that the defendant
knew it violated the terms of use in part because that condition is
ambiguous as applied to this conduct.
In addition, the mistake of law defense from Rehaif360 and the
trespass cases361 should also afford defendants a powerful defense
in cases such as Citrin, which are premised upon an employee’s duty
of loyalty.362 In the vast majority of cases, prosecutors will struggle
to establish guilt because they must show several related steps.
Prosecutors must prove the defendant: (i) knew of some other law
such as a state duty of loyalty law; (ii) knew this separate law
applies to their conduct; (iii) knew their particular type of access
violates that separate law (perhaps because of some complex
interaction between that law and their employer’s policy manual);
and finally, (iv) knew that violating that separate law actually does
revoke their authorization to access.
A. Van Buren v. United States
As a threshold matter, the question presented to the Supreme
Court in Van Buren v. United States does not involve mens rea.363
Rather, it involves a separate question that is harder to answer:
Does a person who has authority, including a valid password, to
access a work database violate the CFAA if he accesses that same
information for an unsanctioned purpose?364 Indeed, many of the
prominent CFAA cases involve this question—prosecutions of police
officers,365 government employees,366 or corporate employees367 who
use a valid login to view information out of curiosity or for some
360. 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2019).
361. See supra Part IV.B.
362. 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006).
363. See Question Presented, Van Buren v. United States, No. 19-783 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020)
(“Whether a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain
purposes violates Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses the
same information for an improper purpose.”).
364. See id.
365. E.g., United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 2015).
366. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010) (involving a
Social Security Administration employee); United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1071
(1st Cir. 1997) (involving an IRS employee).
367. Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269
(5th Cir. 2010).
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more nefarious purpose. That purpose question lies outside the
scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, the Van Buren case also happens to show just how
powerful a robust mens rea can be as a defense against aggressive
applications of the CFAA. It shows how an appropriate use of mens
rea will help to sideline many of these difficult purpose cases by af-
fording a strong defense along a separate dimension.
Take Van Buren’s facts as an example. My framework would have
required the prosecution to show that knowingly applies to whether
Van Buren exceeded his authorization in trying to access the license
plate information.368 It would have required a jury instruction that
the mens rea of knowingly applies to authorization. Perhaps most
importantly, the trial court should have instructed the jury that it
must find Van Buren consciously and subjectively understood that
accessing the license plate database was not only “wrong” in some
sense but also contrary to a specific prohibition that would have the
effect of terminating his authorization to access the database.
But at trial, the judge provided the jury instructions that failed
to meet this basic standard.369 The judge told the jury only that it
must find Van Buren intentionally accessed the computer and then
exceeded his access.370 Indeed, the actual instruction tended to
imply that no mens rea applied to exceeding authorized access by
separating that element off from the conduct.371 In particular, the
judge instructed that the jury must find “the defendant intention-
ally accessed a computer in a way or to an extent beyond the
permission given.”372
The jury instruction certainly never said, as it should have, that
“intentionally,” or any other mens rea, applied to the “exceeding”
element.373 The jury could well have concluded that Van Buren
intentionally accessed, and then merely have found that the li-
cense plate information exceeded his rights. The jury may not have
found that Van Buren truly knew that accessing the license plate
368. See United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (mem.).
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information both exceeded his rights and rendered his access with-
out authorization; or, more precisely, the jury may not have found
Van Buren knew he was not “entitled” to obtain that information.
Similarly, the prosecution’s opening and closing arguments
focused primarily on whether the defendant exceeded his access
rights in such a way as to leave aside any consideration of whether
Van Buren knew this.374 The defense similarly did not argue mens
rea at trial, but rather it argued the purpose argument: that a
wrongful purpose can never vitiate initial authorization.375
Putting aside this failure to provide the jury the proper standard,
we can still survey the trial evidence supporting mens rea—without
examining the trial record comprehensively. The evidence empha-
sized in closing and on appeal showed that Van Buren conceded his
attempt to access the license plate information “was ‘wrong.’”376 The
prosecution showed officers in general are told they cannot use the
database for personal reasons,377 and it may have shown such use
is a crime under state law.378 But it did not show, apparently, that
Van Buren attended these trainings or knew gaining access for per-
sonal reasons terminated authorization as opposed to something
short of that. Van Buren may have believed it was morally wrong to
obtain the information but not have realized he was legally not
entitled to obtain that information. The parties at trial did not focus
on mens rea. Perhaps the evidence would have shown Van Buren’s
access exceeded authorization, but in the end, he was entitled to a
jury instruction that required such a finding.
My insistence on such a literal application of true, subjective, and
conscious knowledge may seem overly technical, but it is what
Congress intended when it amended the CFAA to enhance its mens
rea, as discussed thoroughly above.379 Congress eliminated a version
of knowledge that would have included “practically certain” and
374. Id. at 75; Appellant’s Appendix Volume I at 65, Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir.
2019) (No. 18-12024).
375. Appellant’s Appendix Volume I, supra note 374, at 73.
376. Van Buren, 940 F.3d at 1198.
377. Id. at 1208.
378. Brief United States in Opposition at 3, Van Buren v. United States, No. 19-783, (U.S.
Mar. 10, 2020).
379. See supra Part III.C.
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apparently ruled out “willful blindness” as well.380 It would not be
enough, therefore, even if Van Buren suspected but avoided con-
sciously concluding that he lacked authorization for that purpose.
To use a trespass analogy from the physical world, imagine a host
who invites a guest to a dinner party. The guest enters the home
with permission. At dinner, the guest insults the host, uses
profanity, humiliates him in front of his other friends, and hurts his
feelings. This conduct is wrong and even contrary to the purposes
and assumptions of the invitation. But the insults do not make the
guest a trespasser; the insults do not automatically vitiate the
permission to be there, and we certainly cannot conclude the guest
knows he must leave. Indeed, the host might want him to leave and
make a face that most reasonable people would understand says,
“Leave.” Even still, we likely cannot conclude that the guest knows
he must leave. If the host says “Please leave,” we can probably
conclude the guest now knows he must leave. But the guest could
still argue that he thinks the host is joking when he says, “Please
leave,” even if that understanding is unreasonable. Until the guest
consciously understands that he must leave, the guest is not a
trespasser because there is no mens rea of “knowingly.”
Finally, consider the facts in Rehaif that closely parallel those in
Van Buren and other CFAA cases. In Rehaif, the defendant was
convicted of possessing a gun while being in the United States
“unlawfully.”381 In fact, he was in the United States lawfully at first,
so the question was really whether he overstayed his wel-
come—similar to exceeding authorized access to a computer.382 As
in Van Buren, the trial court in Rehaif did not tell the jury it must
find Rehaif knew he was here unlawfully. Worse, the trial judge
expressly told the jury it need not make this finding.383 The
Supreme Court held, as noted above, that the jury instruction was
380. See supra Part III.C.
381. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019).
382. True, the facts of the cases differ in one way. Rehaif exceeded his permission to be in
the United States lawfully along the dimension of time; he stayed here too long. Id. at 2194-
95. Van Buren exceeded his authorized use because of his purpose and not because he stayed
on the computer too long. United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192, 1208 (11th Cir. 2019),
cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (mem.). But this difference does not matter for mens rea
purposes because either way the question is whether the defendant knew his presence, or type
of access, exceeded authorization.
383. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2194.
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wrong and that the prosecution must prove Rehaif knew he was
here unlawfully.384 The Court remanded for the trial court to de-
termine whether the error was harmless.
On remand, the trial court found the error was not harmless
because it was not clear that Rehaif knew his right to be in the
United States had terminated.385 Again, note how parallel the facts
are to Van Buren. Rehaif knew he flunked out and even told the FBI
during his interrogation that he knew “he was ‘out of status.’”386 The
school sent him an email that he would lose his immigration status
if he failed to transfer to another school.387 The prosecution also
showed that the school provides initial training to foreign students
at the beginning of the year on immigration status.388
Nevertheless, the trial court found a reasonable juror could have
concluded that Rehaif did not know he was in the United States
unlawfully because of other facts.389 Rehaif had not attended that
school training session for foreign students.390 The school could not
show he had read the email.391 He otherwise acted openly in being
in the United States, even applying for a hunting license.392 Applied
to the CFAA, Rehaif on remand shows just how powerful this mens
rea defense can be and how hard for a prosecutor to show that a
defendant truly knew her access was without authorization.
B. Jury Instructions
CFAA jury instructions nationwide appear similarly deficient in
requiring that juries find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
defendant truly knew her access was without authorization, or that
it exceeded authorization—at least when we survey federal pattern
jury instructions that apply either nationwide,393 or in particular,
384. Id. at 2200.
385. United States v. Rehaif, No. 6:16-CR-3-ORL-28GJK, 2020 WL 1904068, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 17, 2020).
386. Id. at *2.
387. Id. at *1.
388. See id. at *1, *4.
389. See id. at *5.
390. See id. at *1.
391. See id.
392. Id. at *1, *5.
393. 2A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY AND
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federal circuit courts of appeal.394 Several circuits have not created
pattern jury instructions for the CFAA, but those that have
generally suffer the same problem as the instructions in Van Buren.
These pattern jury instructions fail at several critical junctures.
They fail to inform juries that the mens rea term in the statute,
“intentionally,” collapses into knowingly395—without doing so, a jury
might reasonably conclude that it applies to the conduct of access
only. They fail to instruct juries that knowingly applies to the
attendant circumstance of “without authorization” or “exceeds
authorization.”396 They fail to define knowingly as subjective,
conscious understanding (ruling out “practically certain” or “willful
blindness”).397 Finally, they fail to instruct juries on the quasi-
mistake of law defense: that the defendant must have read and
understood any terms of service, or any other law, and consciously
concluded that those sources make his access unauthorized.398
A typical pattern instruction with nationwide application sim-
ply restates the statute, stating, for example, that the jury must
find the “[d]efendant intentionally accessed a computer without
authorization”399—an instruction followed by some individual cir-
cuits.400 This instruction will confuse the jury. It may well apply “in-
tentionally” to access only and apply no mens rea to the “without
authorization” element. If it does apply some mens rea to “without
authorization,” which mens rea will it likely apply? Knowingly?
Should have known?
The pattern jury instructions for the Eleventh Circuit are worse,
especially for the element “exceeds authorized access.” For this
element, the Eleventh Circuit pattern jury instructions require a
jury to find that “the defendant intentionally accessed a computer
... in a way or to an extent beyond the permission given.”401 It goes
PRACTICE INSTRUCTIONS § 42:06 (6th ed. 2020).
394. E.g., PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM. CASES), O42.2, (ELEVENTH CIR. JUD. COMM.
ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2020) [hereinafter ELEVENTH CIR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
395. See, e.g., id.
396. See, e.g., id.
397. See, e.g., id.
398. See, e.g., id.
399. 2A O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 393, § 42:06.
400. E.g., PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., 369 (COMM. ON FED.
CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR. 2012).
401. ELEVENTH CIR. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 394.
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on to define this formula as applying to a person who uses “autho-
rized access to get or change information that the person is not
permitted to get or change.”402 These instructions suggest that the
mens rea of “intentionally” applies to access only and that the jury
need find no mens rea with respect to whether the defendant had
permission to obtain that particular information. They certainly fail
to make clear that a mens rea of knowingly applies and what that
means.
These pattern jury instructions typically draw from binding
appellate case law in that circuit, but those cases are typically
spelling out the legally required elements and not proposing jury
instructions that will be clear to ordinary jurors. That is, in stating
the elements of the CFAA, an appellate court will typically assume
the reader is a lawyer who understands that the term “intention-
ally” will apply to all later elements and that it will collapse into
knowingly as applied to attendant circumstances. We cannot make
these assumptions about juries, of course, and we must be careful
to instruct that they must find that the defendant knew her access
was without authorization.
C. Public Platforms
The foregoing discussion leverages a robust mens rea to rule out
prosecuting many cases of ordinary individuals unaware of access
restrictions or prohibitions, but sophisticated business entities or
institutions may have studied terms of service and separate laws to
conclude that certain access methods might well violate such terms.
The recent Sandvig v. Barr case involved just such sophisticated
individuals and institutions—academic researchers who sought to
create fake accounts on large web platforms in violation of those
platforms’ terms of service.403 For them, even a robust mens rea of
knowingly might often be met.
402. Id.
403. Civil Action No. 16-1368 (JDB), 2020 WL 1494065, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2020),
appeal docketed, No. 20-5153 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2020); Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers,
99 TEX.L.REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=366
5040 [https://perma.cc/SF74-VW59] (critiquing the power of platforms to exclude researchers).
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But my proposal for public platforms would require more: per-
sonally communicated notice. Thus, even if a person knows that
terms of service prohibit her access, she may still access until she
receives a personal notice, such as a cease-and-desist letter from the
platform banning her access. This requirement of personally com-
municated notice, if adopted by courts, would likely protect many
researchers and institutions. These platforms might fear bad pub-
licity by expressly banning researchers on racial or gender dis-
crimination or other kinds of bias.
But when a platform does send a cease-and-desist letter, my
proposal would enlarge culpability compared to the rule adopted by
hiQ Labs. Under my proposed interpretation, hiQ Labs comes out
the other way. When LinkedIn expressly told hiQ Labs to stay
out,404 any future access was without authorization. In response to
the argument that LinkedIn cannot open its site to the public
generally but can kick out some visitors, that simply contradicts
how criminal trespass law works in the physical world.
Recent trespass cases such as Blankenhorn—cited by hiQ
Labs—and Alexis show us that trespass law bestows great power
upon property owners: the power to selectively exclude for any
reason or no reason at all.405 To take a common real-world example,
Walmart stores regularly ban persons by serving them personalized
written notice. This notice states that Walmart reserves the right to
ban those who shoplift, destroy property, or “otherwise behave in a
manner that is unacceptable to Walmart.”406
The CFAA applied these (unfortunate) trespass principles to
computers by using precisely the same language in the text as
criminal trespass statutes do and by indicating it intended the
CFAA to be analogized to criminal trespass laws. We can just barely
justify personally communicated notice as arising, by analogy, from
the trespass cases; we cannot justify, however, interpreting a
trespass provision such that it never applies to public platforms.
404. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for
cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2020).
405. See Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 474 (9th Cir. 2007); Alexis v.
McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., 67 F.3d 341, 350 (1st Cir. 1995).
406. State v. Zimbelman, No. 111759, 2015 WL 4577693, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. July 24,
2015).
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This interpretation, the best interpretation of the statute, does
confer too much power on platforms, making them “digital gate-
keepers.”407 The answer, however, is not to ignore the plain meaning
of the statute; the answer, rather, is to repeal it, as I discuss in the
last Part of this Article.
VI. THE PROBLEM WITH A CODE-BASED REGIME
In this Part, I further show how treating the CFAA as a criminal
statute undermines many of the reasons supporting a code-based
regime. I have already shown how mens rea eliminates cases in
which the defendant might not have notice of the terms of service.
This mens rea makes the notice function of a code-based regime
completely unnecessary. This Part furthers the argument by
showing that the code-based test is actually more vague than the
plain meaning of “without authorization.”
This Part next takes another, more detailed look at the legislative
history of the CFAA. It does so within the context of ordinary
criminal law principles to show why those advocating the code-based
regime, including the Ninth Circuit in hiQ Labs, have misread, or
at least over-read, that legislative history.
A. A Code-Based Regime Is Vague
The code-based regime itself is vague and hard to apply and will,
therefore, give less notice in many situations. This follows because
the code-based test lacks any underlying principle with which to
determine its scope in new situations.
Take, for example, the test in hiQ Labs and most recently
elaborated by Kerr—bypassing a technological barrier that authen-
ticates users.408 The test sounds straightforward, but what about an
example Kerr himself raises: a site, such as the Washington Post or
the New York Times, that limits the number of free visits by use of
407. Kadri, supra note 403.
408. See hiQ Labs, Inc., 485 F.3d at 1001-03; Kerr, supra note 11, at 1161.
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cookies or blocking IP addresses.409 Such sites want readers to sign
up for subscriptions after the free limit.410
In response, a user might clear her cache of cookies, browse in
“incognito mode,” or use a VPN to disguise her IP address; all are
simple expedients that may bypass those limits. But in doing so, she
has breached a code-based barrier and, therefore, under the code-
based test, should be guilty of unauthorized access under the CFAA.
But Kerr says this use of cookies or IP-blocking to limit access
would not count as a technological barrier based on authentication
under his test.411 This is an odd conclusion and shows how vague his
test is. After all, cookies and IP addresses are used in this scenario
to authenticate a user via her browser and computer, and they are
technological barriers used to prevent an unauthorized person from
accessing the site after the limit has been reached. The site
determines the person has met her limit by authenticating, through
the use of cookies, that it is the same web browser and computer.
Kerr finesses this problem by saying that this use of cookies or IP
blocking erects a “speed bump” only and is not really a “barrier.”412
But according to what principle? Because it is easy to circumvent?
Why should that matter?
By contrast, under my view, this cookie and IP blocking regime
shows that the computer owner does not want the individual to
continue to access the site; the access is without authorization.
Indeed, the New York Times terms of service state that a person is
prohibited from evading the technological limit on free visits.413
Perhaps a person who clears her cache or browses incognito may not
know her access is without authorization; if not, she cannot be
guilty. But if she does know, the plain terms of the statute criminal-
ize her conduct. Of course, I have argued above that public plat-
forms should also be required to mail a personally communicated
cease-and-desist letter. If a court accepted that protective gloss on
the statute, she would likely not be guilty. In the vast majority of
cases, websites such as the New York Times are unlikely to identify




413. Terms of Service, N.Y. TIMES, https://help.nytimes.com/hc/en-us/articles/1150148934
28-Terms-of-service#4 [https://perma.cc/H8YR-E2ZB].
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a person who has cleared her cache to access beyond the limit and
send them a personal cease-and-desist letter.
Unlike Kerr’s attempt to distinguish this type of situation as not
really a code-based evasion, my proposal requiring personal
communication does rest upon a principle. Personally communicated
notice is precisely the manner in which many states handle the
difficult question of criminal trespass to a public place,414 and the
CFAA was intended to follow such state law.415 A personally
communicated notice also furthers the goals of the elements actually
in the text: it helps to establish mens rea, and it shows that the host
website genuinely does not want the visitor to continue visit-
ing—especially if we decide that this use of cookies to limit visits is
ambiguous to the average visitor.416
Password sharing and stealing cases are also unclear under the
code-based regime. Suppose a person steals a password in the
physical world by reading it off a post-it note. She then uses the
password to access the other person’s computer account. The
intruder has not circumvented a code-based barrier in the sense of
hacking the password or otherwise circumventing code on the
system. Instead, she has used the password precisely as intended.
Her circumvention occurred in the physical world and was, there-
fore, not a code-based circumvention.
And yet, we certainly want to consider stealing and using a
password as access without authorization. How do we know? The
intrusion is without authorization not because the person breached
a code-based barrier, but rather because she knew she was access-
ing without authorization. We can establish she knew because she
stole a password.
Again, an analogy to the real world helps. If a person steals a key
to a home and enters it, she has not broken in, but she has tres-
passed because her entry was without authorization. And she knows
it was without authorization because she stole the key.
Even at its core, the hiQ Labs code-based test falls apart. It de-
lineates between public and private areas and information based
414. See supra notes 305-13 and accompanying text.
415. See supra Part IV.A.
416. This last point does fall under “without authorization” but is rooted in the plain
meaning of that term rather than the code-based effort.
636 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:571
upon a login,417 but that dividing line—logging in—does not accord
with ordinary intuitions about what is public on such platforms.
After all, Facebook, LinkedIn, and many other sites require a login
to access most information. But once a person has logged in, she has
access to much of the public-facing information of hundreds of
millions of other accounts that she did not have access to before she
logged in. Yet even this next level of information surely counts as
public. Any adult can get an account on Facebook, sign in, and see
nearly a billion profiles. Rather, the line between private and public
is more nuanced and likely comes, at least on Facebook, at the next
level of intimacy, “friends of friends.”
LinkedIn limits the number of profiles a person who is not logged
in can visit to ten; a person logged in can visit all 690 million
profiles.418 As with Facebook, this next level of information is public
by any ordinary meaning of that term. Indeed, it is precisely the
information that the individual account holder will have denomi-
nated as “public.”
And yet the holding in hiQ Labs would deem this information
private merely because it is behind a login, even though anyone can
get an account and log in.419 The difference seems to turn on a
technicality of the way large platforms work and not on any
difference in culpability, privacy, or some sense that one method is
more of a “hack” than the other. Indeed, in response to the rule in
hiQ Labs, a platform can simply move information behind the login
and transform its terms of service from ineffective suggestions to
operative exclusions.
The wall of such a login is so easily surmounted that it is really
more of a curb one must step up onto in order to enter a mall. This
ease of access makes this test based on a password not only the
wrong line for what counts as private but also, again, a vague test
for where the line lies.
Finally, and perhaps most absurdly, almost everyone accesses the
internet itself through an Internet Service Provider (ISP) that
417. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1001-03 (9th Cir. 2019), petition
for cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2020).
418. About LinkedIn, Statistics, LINKEDIN: NEWSROOM, https://news.linkedin.com/about-
us#1 [https://perma.cc/EQ3M-VDT8].
419. 938 F.3d at 1001-03.
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requires a login and password. When I log into my ISP, as I must to
get access, does this now mean the entire internet counts as the type
of private information suddenly protected by the CFAA? If so, hiQ
Labs gets us nowhere.
Now one might argue that the login and password to get into the
internet does not count because that authentication is erected by the
ISP and not the web platform that potentially complains about
access. But nothing in hiQ Labs supports that distinction because
hiQ Labs rests upon the nature of information—dividing public from
private. Moreover, as noted above, hiQ Labs expressly acknowledges
a mismatch between how we establish that information is
private—a password regime—and how we might find that a person
accesses without authorization.420
Finally, and perhaps most fatally, at least Kerr’s elaboration of
the new, refined test still retains a vague catch-all provision. That
is, in addition to breaches of authentication gates, Kerr’s test
reserves a category of other methods of breaching technological
barriers that will count as being without authorization.421 This
category involves exploits that “otherwise ‘break in.’”422
What it means to “otherwise break in” is itself hopelessly vague.
He concedes it must be determined on a very fact-intensive inquiry,
comparing the technology breached with the norms of the internet.
For example, he argues an SQL-injection attack counts as a breach,
but the hack in United States v. Auernheimer—which also involved
entering code into a web browser—does not.423 He concedes that
“[t]he lines here are subtle, to be clear.”424 The two cases strike me
420. Id.
421. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1172.
422. Id.
423. In an SQL-injection attack, a hacker enters valid information into a search form on
a website but adds particular characters at the end of her query. See SQL Injection,
PORTSWIGGER, https://portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection [https://perma.cc/FA7K-
YR3Q]. The web platform server interprets these extra characters as separate code rather
than part of the query. See id. It executes the code, giving the hacker additional access. In
United States v. Auernheimer, the defendants entered a URL into their browser, but added
a number at the end that acted as an identifier for another’s account, allowing the defendants
to access a portion of that account. 748 F.3d 525, 530-31 (3d Cir. 2014). The defendants wrote
a computer program to repeat this process 114,000 times, gaining the email addresses of
114,000 account holders. Id. at 531. Kerr argues these two cases differ. See Kerr, supra note
11, at 1172-73. The first would violate the CFAA; the second would not, in his view. See id.
424. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1173.
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as indistinguishable by any principle that would give fair notice,
however, illustrating a test too vague for criminal law purposes.
What we can see here is that the code-based test and its elabora-
tions do not work because they attempt to erect proxies for what the
statute actually forbids: intentionally accessing without authori-
zation.425 Breaching a code-based barrier may sometimes establish
that a person knew her access was without authorization and
sometimes not. But it fails as a substitute for the actual test.
Prosecutors, courts, and juries need to look at all the circumstances
to determine whether the person knew her access was without
authorization.
B. The Hacker Paradigm Amended Away
Many courts,426 including the hiQ Labs court,427 also argue that
the CFAA primarily targets hackers. Congress sought to address a
particular paradigm described expressly in the legislative history:
a youth at home with his or her PC dialing into a government or
bank computer and hacking in by guessing the password through a
brute force attack.428 As a result, the CFAA applies, they argue, only
to areas or information protected by a password, and we should,
therefore, use a code-based regime to interpret “without authoriza-
tion.”429
This hacker-paradigm argument has superficial appeal. After all,
the CFAA originally applied only to government, bank, and credit
agency computers that would likely have been protected by login
credentials and contained particularly private information, such as
425. See Thaw, supra note 188, at 943.
426. See Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka,
581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp.
2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz.
2008); Diamond Power Int’l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2007);
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499
(D. Md. 2005)).
427. 938 F.3d 985, 1000 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9,
2020).
428. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984) (“Compounding this is the advent of the
activities of so-called ‘hackers,’ who have been able to access (trespass into) both private and
public computer systems, sometimes with potentially serious results.”).
429. E.g., hiQ Labs, 938 F.3d at 1001.
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classified or financial information.430 The legislative history points
to this paradigm. The congressional reports,431 as well as floor
speeches,432 frame the problem as one of hackers “breaking into”
computers by breaching passwords. This paradigm also supplied the
cultural background and accessible touchstone for many govern-
ment officials, including President Reagan.433
But we must temper this argument with two observations. First,
this paradigm may have motivated the CFAA, but the text Congress
chose does not limit its ambit to this application. The term “without
authorization” is not ambiguous such that we would even look at the
legislative history to limit it to a particular type of access.
Second, and more importantly, Congress later broadened the
statute beyond this initial paradigm. The original law applied to
government, bank, and credit agency computers and information
only.434 But as detailed above,435 a series of later amendments, taken
together, expanded both the type of computers and type of informa-
tion. Under those amendments, the CFAA applies to any computer,
at least if it is connected to the internet, and to any information
whatsoever. The original paradigm of a hacker cracking a password
rested upon those original computers protected—government and
bank computers—that generally did have password protection. It
also rested on particularly sensitive types of information that would
also have been protected by password access. It is from that original
law that the court in hiQ Labs was able to say that a password is
what delineates public from private.436 But when Congress expanded
the CFAA to include any computer and any information, it expanded
430. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190-92.
431. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10, 20.
432. E.g., 130 CONG. REC. 20,642 (1984) (statement of Rep. Hughes); id. at 20,644
(statement of Rep. Nelson).
433. STEPHANIE RICKER SCHULTE, CACHED: DECODING THE INTERNET IN GLOBAL POPULAR
CULTURE 26, 47 (2013) (describing how a partial motivation for the CFAA came after
President Reagan watched the movie War Games about a young hacker who accidentally
breaks into a military computer, causing chaos and nearly starting World War III).
434. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, § 2102(a), 98
Stat. at 2190-91.
435. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
436. 938 F.3d 985, 1001 (9th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1116 (U.S. Mar. 9,
2020).
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the scope of the statute to computers and information that are often
not protected by passwords or other code-based protections.
One might argue that even with the expansion to any computer
and any information, we should read a limit into the CFAA that
covers only those computers and information that are protected by
passwords because the original computers and information would
have been so protected. But why? We do not import any other aspect
of those previous limits. The statutory text notwithstanding, we do
not say that the CFAA protects only information analogous to
classified government or sensitive bank information. Instead, we
really mean any information.
An analogy to criminal trespass helps here. Burglary originally
applied to dwellings only, but in the twentieth century, states
expanded the locus to any building or structure.437 Similarly,
modern trespass law applies to any building or structure and even
to any place, such as a mall or park.438 We would never say a
trespass statute that expanded beyond homes to include stores does
not really include stores because originally the statute only applied
to homes.
Finally, Kerr has argued that the CFAA protects only private
information or areas delimited by a code-based barrier because of
the norms of the internet rather than legislative history.439 His
argument also cannot withstand the dictates of trespass law. In the
physical world, malls, parks, and stores are presumptively open to
the public, but criminal trespass laws still apply to those public
areas.440 A person ordered to leave must do so.441 The presumption
of license has been revoked for that individual.442
VII. CRIMINAL TRESPASS: A POOR MODEL
The bulk of this Article takes the CFAA as it is and proposes the
best interpretation based upon ordinary interpretative tools. This
proposed interpretation happens to address many of the unjust
437. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.1(c).
438. Id. § 21.2(b).
439. Kerr, supra note 11, at 1161, 1171.
440. See LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2(b).
441. Id. § 21.2(a).
442. See id.
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applications that courts and scholars have identified. But even my
interpretation leaves many potential unjust applications that
cannot be interpreted out of the ambit of the statute according to
any ordinary principle.
This problem leads to a more radical proposal, in tension with the
foregoing, but nevertheless important: we should abolish the
trespass provision of the CFAA. Others have argued for major
amendments to the provision,443 or to abolish it,444 and I will not
repeat those strong arguments here. Instead, I will add only one
particular argument that we can draw from a survey of the state
criminal trespass laws.
To be clear, I do not argue that we should abolish the entirety of
the CFAA. Quite the contrary, we can safely abolish the simple
trespass provision, section (a)(2)(C), precisely because other
provisions of the CFAA readily address trespasses accompanied by
true harms, such as unauthorized access to steal money, financial
information, health information, or classified information.445
Similarly, section (a)(5) prohibits causing damage to the target
computer, such as deleting information or making it crash.446 Even
with respect to simple trespass to a computer to view information,
to the extent we want to afford protection to information such as
medical records or nude photos, we can craft carefully tailored laws
to address those particular types of privacy invasion—but likely as
part of a privacy law rather than a computer-specific law.
This Part very briefly sketches what we can learn from ordinary
trespass cases in particular to support abolishing the trespass
provision of the CFAA. I present criminal trespass at its worst to
illustrate its pathology. Its abuse by states for segregation447 or
massive urban social control448 may seem far afield from accessing
443. See, e.g., Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013); Kadri, supra note
403 (arguing Congress should exempt public platforms from protection under the CFAA).
444. See, e.g., Matwyshyn & Pell, supra note 89, at 511-12, 514; Simmons, supra note 273,
at 1712-14 (arguing the CFAA is overbroad, is vague, and fails to grade according to
culpability, whereas agency regulations would better adapt to changing technology with better
definitions).
445. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(4).
446. Id. § 1030(a)(5).
447. See, e.g., City of Greenville v. Peterson, 122 S.E.2d 826, 828 (S.C. 1961), rev’d, 373 U.S.
244 (1963).
448. See, e.g., Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 518, 544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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a computer, scraping data, and violating terms of service. In some
ways, it is. Nonetheless, the worst of the criminal trespass cases and
the problem with criminalizing mere computer trespass share one
similarity: they basically criminalize mere presence without a
showing of some other harm, such as theft, fraud, or damage.449
During the Jim Crow era, one of the methods states and local
businesses used to enforce segregation, and particularly to exclude
protestors, was criminal trespass.450 In case after case, stores,451
playgrounds,452 and other areas kicked out Black people or their
white allies, whether they were protesting or simply living, using
trespass law. The supreme courts of these states regularly upheld
the right of these property owners to enlist the police to forcibly
remove these visitors or protestors.453 The same courts affirmed the
criminal trespass convictions.454 A property owner had an unfettered
right to exclude, even if based on race or speech.455
As the Supreme Court of North Carolina held: “[A]lthough the
general public have an implied license to enter a retail store, the
proprietor is at liberty to revoke this license at any time ... and to
eject such individual ... if he refuses to leave when requested to do
so.”456 The court made clear that property owners may exclude for
any reason, including race, and that the involvement of the police
and courts in the arrest does not amount to state action triggering
the Equal Protection Clause.457
449. See Matwyshyn & Pell, supra note 89, at 511.
450. State v. Goldfinch, 132 So. 2d 860, 861 (La. 1961), rev’d sub nom. Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); State v. Avent, 118 S.E.2d 47, 57 (N.C. 1961), vacated, 373
U.S. 375 (1963); Peterson, 122 S.E.2d at 828; Randolph v. Commonwealth, 119 S.E.2d 817 (Va.
1961), vacated, 374 U.S. 97 (1963); see also John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of
the “State Action” Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 863
(1966); The Supreme Court 1962 Term: Maintaining Racial Segregation Through State
Criminal Trespass Prosecutions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 127, 127 (1963).
451. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
452. Wright v. State, 122 S.E.2d 737, 741 (Ga. 1961), rev’d, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (affirming
breach of the peace convictions of six defendants for playing basketball in park while Black).
453. See supra notes 450-52 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 450-52 and accompanying text.
455. Peterson, 122 S.E.2d at 828.
456. State v. Avent, 118 S.E.2d 47, 52 (N.C. 1961) (internal quotations omitted), vacated,
373 U.S. 375 (1963).
457. Id. at 52-54.
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The United States Supreme Court often overruled these cases but
did not question the underlying principle—that a property owner
may exclude at will.458 Indeed, oddly, the Supreme Court never
clearly held that a racist business that enlists a police officer to
remove someone, and enlists the state machinery to prosecute for
trespass, has triggered sufficient state action.459 It did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause for the police to arrest, juries to convict,
and courts to sentence a person for criminal trespass even if the
underlying reason for exclusion was race. The Court always
required some plus factor to show a nexus between the state
government’s segregation policy and the store policy, and it was only
this plus factor that allowed it to vacate many of these convic-
tions.460
It took the Civil Rights Act to simply supersede the state law of
criminal trespass when based on race. The Court held that once it
was unlawful for a business to exclude based on race, it was
unlawful to criminally convict a Black person for refusing to leave.461
Today, the same rule applies for the Free Speech Clause. Courts
have regularly held that the Constitution does not prohibit private
property owners, even owners of property open to the public, from
excluding for any reason, including reasons related to speech462—
though California is a notable exception under its state
constitution.463 When those property owners enlist the assistance of
the police to arrest and the courts to convict individuals accused of
trespassing, this assistance does not amount to state action.464
However arbitrary the reason for exclusion, once a person tres-
passes in defiance of that order, enforcement by the government of
the trespass laws is deemed neutral.465
458. See, e.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
459. See Silard, supra note 450, at 865-66.
460. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970); Peterson, 373 U.S. at 248.
461. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 308 (1964).
462. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 588 (1972).
463. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74
(1980).
464. Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest Home, 667 F.2d 238, 243 (1st
Cir. 1981); Williams v. Nagel, 643 N.E.2d 816, 820 (Ill. 1994); City of Sunnyside v. Lopez, 751
P.2d 313, 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Horn, 407 N.W.2d 854, 860 (Wis. 1987).
465. See, e.g., Lopez, 751 P.2d at 319.
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These cases show that part of the problem lies with trespass laws
themselves. Facially neutral, they afford property owners not only
a right to exclude selectively and at will, but also the right to engage
the machinery of the state to enforce that arbitrary will. Histori-
cally, the reason for exclusion was not merely arbitrary but also
pernicious and racist.
We can turn this same critique to the computer trespass provision
of the CFAA. It likewise criminalizes violating the unilateral terms
of the platform, however arbitrary or eccentric they may be. The
government has essentially delegated to the platform the power to
declare what is or is not criminal by means of their terms of service.
The platforms have enlisted the criminal authorities to enforce their
policies.
We can potentially draw two conclusions from the above. The first
is that of many scholars. They argue the CFAA must be unconstitu-
tionally vague because it affords the power to private platforms to
unilaterally criminalize conduct via arbitrary terms of service.466
But the trespass cases both immediately above and throughout this
Article make clear that this argument fails. Ordinary trespass cases
allow owners of property open to the public to do just that—even
when their reasons are based on speech and, historically, on race.
The second conclusion we can draw is mine: these problems are
a good reason to abolish the computer trespass provision. As a
matter of policy, computer platforms ought not have the power to
unilaterally determine what conditions of access will expose visitors
to criminal sanctions. I have argued above that the only defensible
interpretation of the CFAA does give them that power; the only
remaining solution is, therefore, repeal.
Even today, criminal trespass law remains a tool of social control
often leading to unjust enforcement and discrimination. In New
York City, for example, the police operated a program called the
Trespass Affidavit Program (TAP).467 Private landlords for buildings
serving poor and minority communities were encouraged to
authorize police to enter and arrest anyone suspected of trespass—
that is, of not being a resident or guest.468 TAP was so widespread
466. See Kerr, supra note 38, at 1581-82.
467. Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
468. Id. at 484-85.
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nearly every private apartment building in some Bronx neighbor-
hoods became enrolled.469 The goal was to rid the building of drug
trafficking and other crime. But too often, according to the court,
police swept every floor and hallway, stopping or arresting people
merely because they were close to one of the buildings, or had just
entered or left it.470
A federal judge in Ligon v. City of New York enjoined the pro-
gram; she found that this widespread practice violated the indi-
viduals’ Fourth Amendment rights.471 The police conducted stops
without reasonable suspicion, and this violation was so widespread
that the city was held responsible.472
Even for those not arrested, note that criminal trespass law
became the mechanism for stopping, questioning, and frisking large
numbers of poor and minority residents, guests, and others.473 Note
too that in many ways, criminal trespass itself does not result in
harm. Rather, the law serves as a proxy to prevent other crimes that
are harder to detect, such as burglary or drug dealing.474 But as
implemented, the police ended up using trespass to stop people
innocent not only of trespass but certainly also of those more serious
crimes.475
The Ligon litigation demonstrates that criminal trespass can be
arbitrarily enforced on very large numbers of people engaged in
innocent and routine daily behavior. Yet neither that court nor any
other has held that criminal trespass laws are therefore themselves
unconstitutional. Our answer here again lies not with finding
trespass laws, or the CFAA, unconstitutional, but rather with
repealing at least the online version of criminal trespass.
Now, admittedly, racial or other discrimination on platforms does
not involve a direct prosecution of an individual under the CFAA in
perfect analogy with the foregoing cases in the real world. But
platforms can play host to discrimination.476 Researchers who
469. Id.
470. Id. at 524.
471. Id. at 532.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 484-85.
474. See LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 21.2.
475. See, e.g., Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
476. Kadri, supra note 403 (citing research on the issue); Laurent Sacharoff, Russia Gave
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uncover such discrimination in housing, employment, and other
opportunities often must use scraping, fake accounts, and other
methods that make their access to these platforms unauthorized
under its plain meaning.477 Some of this research apparently led the
federal government to sue Facebook for housing discrimination in
its ads.478 These researchers sometimes fear criminal prosecution
under the CFAA for computer trespass and desist in such important
civil rights research, or at least curtail its scope.479
CONCLUSION
The dominant approach to the trespass provision of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act seeks to limit its unjust sweep by focusing on
the term “without authorization.” The Ninth Circuit in hiQ Labs
recently adopted the view that “without authorization” can never
apply to a public platform when a user does not bypass a techno-
logical barrier that authenticates identity, such as a password
login.480 Nothing about the term “without authorization” supports
this interpretation. Indeed, both scholars and courts have been
seeking a solution in the wrong place, with the wrong methods.
This Article has shown how we must treat the CFAA as a
criminal law. That means using ordinary criminal law interpreta-
tive techniques such as those announced in the Model Penal
Code481—a source Congress expressly adverted to in its legislative
reports on the CFAA. Those techniques include addressing each
statutory element separately and, most importantly, determining
and applying the appropriate mens rea for each.
Bots a Bad Name. Here’s Why We Need Them More Than Ever, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/14/russia-gave-bots-a-bad-name-heres-why-
we-need-them-more-than-ever-219359 [https://perma.cc/B82L-ZL5F].
477. Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18-20 (D.D.C. 2018).
478. See Katie Benner, Glenn Thrush & Mike Isaac, Facebook Engages in Housing
Discrimination With Its Ad Practices, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.
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When we focus on the statute’s mens rea, we are able to eliminate
many of the unjust cases under the CFAA. Its mens rea provides
surprisingly powerful protection by requiring that defendants
subjectively know their access is without authorization.
But we can go further. Congress fashioned the CFAA as a tres-
pass provision. Its text parallels ordinary state criminal trespass
laws, and its legislative history urged the analogy to trespass. This
Article, therefore, draws inspiration from these trespass laws to
propose a special rule for public platforms similar to that for public
places such as malls or stores: the platform must provide to an
individual personally communicated notice that their access rights
are revoked before they can be held liable under the CFAA.
The final Part of this Article, a coda, took my argument in a
different direction. Even the best interpretation of the CFAA leaves
potentially unjust applications. This coda used ordinary trespass
law to show why the only solution may be to simply repeal the
computer trespass provision of the CFAA. Both ordinary and virtual
trespass criminalize mere presence without further harm. Whether
criminal trespass continues to serve a useful role in the real world,
we should not import its serious flaws into the virtual one.
